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Essay
Blaming Youth
Elizabeth S. Scott* and Laurence Steinberg"
In March of 2001, a fourteen-year-old Florida boy named Lionel Tate
was sentenced to life in prison without parole for killing six-year-old Tiffany
Eunick during a wrestling match that took place when Lionel was twelve
years old. Lionel was convicted of first degree murder on the ground that the
killing was the result of aggravated child abuse, a crime that contemplates
injury of a child by an adult caretaker.] His conviction and sentence have
prompted much debate and discussion-about his case and, more generally,
about the criminal punishment of young offenders.2 Although the verdict and
Lionel's sentence received considerable public support, many people are
troubled by a justice system that sends a fourteen-year-old offender to prison
for life. The debate is not about whether Lionel killed Tiffany, or even
whether he represents a threat to public safety. Rather, the contested issue is
whether adolescents who commit crimes should be subject to the same
punishment as their adult counterparts.
This Essay addresses the question of how lawmakers should think about
immaturity in assigning criminal punishment to young offenders. For rea-
sons that have much to do with the peculiar history of juvenile justice policy,
basic questions about the culpability of young law violators and the extent to
which they can fairly be held responsible for their crimes have received
University Professor and Class of 1962 Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of
Law.
Distinguished University Professor and Laura H. Carnell Professor of Psychology, Temple
University; Director, John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Research Network on
Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice. We are grateful to Jeff Fagan, Kent Greenawalt,
Robert Scott, Bill Stuntz, and Frank Zimring for reading and commenting on an earlier draft.
1. Michael Browning et al., Boy, 14, Gets Life in TV Wrestling Death: Killing of 6-Yr.-Old
Playmate Wasn't Just Horseplay, Florida Judge Says, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 10, 2001, at 1 (noting
that the death occurred while Tate was "allegedly demonstrating wrestling techniques on her");
Dana Canedy, At 14, a Life Sentence: Boy Killed Girl in 'Wrestling' Murder, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Mar. 10, 2001, at 1. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04(1)(a)(2)(h) (West 2002) (stating that the
unlawful killing of a human being when committed by a person perpetrating, or attempting to
perpetrate, aggravated child abuse is murder in the first degree and punishable by either life
imprisonment or death).
2. See, e.g., Dana Canedy, As Florida Boy Serves Life Term, Even Prosecution Wonders Why,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at A l; William Claiborne, 13-Year-Old Convicted in Shooting; Decision
to Try Youth As an Adult Sparked Juvenile Justice Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1999, at A3;
Mike Clary, Teen's Life Sentence Sparks Juvenile Punishment Debate, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 2001, at
All.
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surprisingly little attention in policy debates or in the academic literature.3
During most of the 20th century, young offenders were dealt with in a
separate system that held to the view that the disposition of its charges was
not governed by the criminal law. In the rhetoric of the traditional juvenile
court, youths who committed crimes were blameless children in need of
treatment; responsibility and punishment were not part of the vocabulary of
juvenile justice. This model has become largely obsolete in the last
generation. Since the late 1980s, a wave of punitive legal reform has brought
many young offenders into the adult criminal justice system. These reforms
are worrisome; they have been carried out in a highly politicized climate,
driven by exaggerated public fears that seem to be reinforced by illegitimate
racial attitudes.4 In the conceptual void created by traditional juvenile justice
policy, important changes in the processing and punishment of this unique
class of offenders have proceeded with little attention to the conventional
constraints that limit punishment under criminal law doctrine and theory.
Our goal in this Essay is to begin to fill this void by analyzing the
culpability of young offenders within a broader framework of criminal law
doctrine and theory. The starting point is the principle of penal
proportionality, which is the foundation of any legitimate system of state
punishment. Proportionality holds that fair criminal punishment is measured
not only by the amount of harm caused or threatened by the actor, but also by
his blameworthiness. 5 Thus, the question we address is whether, and in what
ways, the immaturity of adolescent offenders is relevant to their blame-
worthiness and to appropriate punishment for their criminal acts. The answer
requires a careful examination of the developmental capacities and processes
that are relevant to adolescent criminal choices, and also of the sources of
excuse and mitigation in criminal law. Our analysis leads us to reject both
the traditional excuse-based model of juvenile justice and the contemporary
full-responsibility approach. Instead, we argue that a model under which
immaturity mitigates responsibility-but does not excuse the criminal acts of
youths who are beyond childhood-is more compatible with conventional
theories of criminal responsibility and the standard doctrines and practices of
the criminal law.
3. There are notable exceptions. See Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young
Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 271 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz
eds., 2000) (arguing that under principles of penal proportionality, immaturity mitigates the
blameworthiness of juvenile offenders); Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Responsibility, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15 (1998) (applying a general theory of criminal responsibility to
juveniles).
4. See infra subpart I(B).
5. Because offenders are overwhelmingly male, we tend to use the male pronoun. For a
discussion of proportionality, see RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 9-10 (1997). See
also Zimring, supra note 3, at 272 (noting that "[a] host of subjective elements affect judgments of
deserved punishment even though the victim is just as dead in each different case").
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Using the tools of developmental psychology, we examine two
important dimensions of adolescence that distinguish this group from adults
in ways that are important to criminal culpability. First, the scientific evi-
dence indicates that teens are simply less competent decisionmakers than
adults, largely because typical features of adolescent psycho-social
development contribute to immature judgment. Adolescent capacities for
autonomous choice, self-management, risk perception and calculation of
future consequences are deficient as compared to those of adults, and these
traits influence decisionmaking in ways that can lead to risky conduct.
6
Second, adolescence is a developmental period in which personal identity
and character are in flux, and begin to take shape through a process of
exploration and experimentation. Youthful involvement in crime is often a
part of this process, and, as such, it reflects the values and preferences of a
transitory stage, rather than those of an individual with a settled identity.
Most young law violators do not become adult criminals, because their
youthful choices are shaped by factors and processes that are peculiar to (and
characteristic of) adolescence.
Because these developmental factors influence their criminal choices,
young wrongdoers are less blameworthy than adults under conventional
criminal law conceptions of mitigation. Contemporary theorists debate
whether the ultimate source of criminal responsibility is the actor's choice or
his character. 7  Choice theorists measure criminal blameworthiness by
focusing on the actor's capacity for rational choice and opportunity to
conform to the law. 8 Character theorists argue instead that culpability is
reduced when the actor can negate the inference that his act derived from bad
character. 9 Although neither character nor choice theorists focus seriously on
6. See infra notes 57-74 and accompanying text; see also Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating
Adolescent Decision-Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 229-35 (1995)
(describing developmental factors that contribute to immature judgment); Laurence Steinberg &
Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent
Decisionmaking, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249 (1996) (providing evidence that age-linked
differences in maturity of judgment account for differences in decisionmaking).
7. See infra subpart III(A). This characterization of the two dominant perspectives seems to be
well recognized. For an excellent description of the debate, see R.A. Duff, Choice, Character, and
Criminal Liability, 12 LAW & PHIL. 345, 367-68 (1993). Michael Moore, a choice theorist, has
described the choice and character perspectives elegantly, although perhaps not in a way that would
be fully endorsed by a character theorist. See Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, 7
SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 29, 49-58 (1990).
8. For an early expression of these views by the acknowledged founder of modem choice
theory, see H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 152 (1968). See also Moore, supra note 7; SANFORD H. KADISH, The Decline of Innocence,
in BLAME AND PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 65 (1987); Joshua Dressier,
Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code, 19
RUTGERS L.J. 671, 701-02 (1988); Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 PENN. L. REv.
1587 (1994); Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 251 (2000).
9. See, e.g., NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY
VALUES 65-68 (1988); Michael D. Bayles, Character, Purpose and Criminal Responsibility, 1 LAW
20031
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how immaturity affects blameworthiness, our analysis demonstrates that a
model of juvenile justice that acknowledges the immature judgment and
unformed character of young actors fits comfortably within both of these
frameworks.
The mitigation-based model that we advance is also consistent with
criminal law doctrine and practice. Excuse and mitigation are available to
two kinds of wrongdoers: those who are very different from ordinary people
(because of endogenous incapacity such as mental disorder), and those who
are ordinary people whose acts were responses to extraordinary circum-
stances or were aberrant in light of their past reputations and conduct.'
°
Young offenders in a real sense belong in both groups. Adolescent
decisionmaking capacity is diminished as compared to adults due to psycho-
social immaturity. At the same time, the scientific evidence suggests that
most young lawbreakers are "ordinary" persons (and quite different from
typical adult criminals) in that normal developmental forces drive their
criminal conduct." This is important in two ways. First, ordinary ado-
lescents are more vulnerable than are adults to exogenous pressures that can
lead to criminal conduct. Further, an important source of mitigation in
criminal law-evidence that the criminal act did not derive from bad moral
character-is as applicable to youths as to upstanding adults who act
aberrantly. 12
The Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, a brief historical account of
the legal response to youth crime reveals how lawmakers have rejected the
traditional juvenile justice model based on non-responsibility in favor of a
regime of full responsibility. In both cases, scant attention has been paid to
the conceptual links between criminal responsibility and the capacities and
circumstances of adolescence. In the contemporary context, the lack of a
theoretical or doctrinal framework has contributed to highly politicized legal
reform. In Part II, we examine the dimensions of adolescent development
that are important to youthful criminal involvement and that distinguish
adolescent choices from those of their adult counterparts. Part III turns to the
role of excuse and mitigation in criminal law. We sketch the contours of
& PHIL. 5, 8-11 (1982); R.B. Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses in the Criminal Law, in 27
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, NOMOS 165 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1985); George
Vuoso, Background, Responsibility and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661, 1662 (1986).
10. This characterization is based loosely on an observation by Sanford Kadish. See Sanford H.
Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 265 (1987) (drawing the distinction between crimes
excused because circumstances were so constraining that most people would have acted similarly,
and crimes excused because of the actors' deficiency of mind). In our analysis we describe three
categories of mitigation: diminished capacity, extraordinary circumstances, and good character. See
infra subpart Ill(B).
11. A small proportion of young offenders mature into adult criminals, and are distinguishable
from typical young offenders whose crimes reflect transitory developmental influences. See infra
notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 100-05 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 81:799
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choice and character theories and examine the conditions and attributes that
can reduce culpability under criminal law doctrine. In the last Part, we draw
on this analysis to offer a mitigation model of juvenile justice that can form
the basis of a separate system of justice, dealing fairly with young offenders
without unduly compromising public protection.
I. Youth Crime Regulation: A Cautionary Tale of Policy Without Theory
Policy-makers have seldom paid much attention to the link between
developmental immaturity and criminal responsibility or sought to tailor the
law's response to the blameworthiness of young offenders. The Progressive
social reformers who established the juvenile court in the late 19th century
classified young offenders as blameless children and sought to remove them
altogether from the reach of the criminal law. 13 Contemporary law-makers
have forcefully rejected this paternalism, reclassifying many young offenders
as adults. 14 Modern regulation, however, exhibits a similar lack of concern
about whether the treatment of young offenders comports with criminal law
policies and principles. The recent reforms provide a cautionary tale about
the perils of developing criminal justice regulation without these constraints.
A. Juvenile Justice Policy: 4 History of Binary Categories
The binary classification of young law violators as either blameless
children or culpable adults represents an application of a more general
regulatory approach toward minors. Although the age boundary between
childhood and adulthood varies in different legal contexts, lawmakers gen-
erally treat each status as a binary category.1 5 Thus, in the construction of
legal childhood, developmental differences between infants and adolescents
get little attention. In most regulatory contexts, this simple classification
scheme works quite well, even though it distorts developmental reality.1 6 As
the following historical account suggests, however, the use of binary cat-
egories has not worked well as a framework for juvenile justice policy,
whether young offenders are treated as children, as they were in the
traditional juvenile justice system, or as adults, as they increasingly are
today. Binary classification has reinforced simplistic understandings of
young offenders' criminal responsibility. Moreover, this taxonomy has
shaped contemporary discourse about juvenile justice in undesirable ways.
Because the debate proceeds as though the policy options were limited to the
13. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
15. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 547, 558-62 (2000) [hereinafter Scott, Legal Construction].
16. Id. at 558-62 (arguing that, in most contexts, this approach is administratively simple,
relatively efficient, and creates a clear signal for those who deal with young persons).
2003]
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choice between adult and child status, questions about the mitigating effects
of immaturity in assessing criminal responsibility are seldom addressed.
At common law, the infancy defense excused young children from all
criminal responsibility on the ground that they lacked the capacity to
understand the wrongfulness of their conduct.17 The defense was narrowly
drawn, however. The presumption that children lacked criminal respon-
sibility could be rebutted for youths between the ages of 7 and 14, and at age
14, offenders were conclusively presumed to have the moral capacity of
adults.18 Thus, common law courts constructed two dichotomous groups-
innocent children and fully responsible adults. Young lawbreakers who were
not excused were subject to the same punishment as adult criminals.
1 9
The Progressive reformers who established the juvenile court
envisioned a regime for the adjudication and disposition of young criminals
in which the criminal law and its procedures would play little part.20  The
new court was part of an ambitious program to expand the boundaries of
childhood, and it offered the law's protection to older youths as well as
young children.21 All delinquents were described as wayward but innocent
children whose parents had failed them, but who could be redirected with the
court's firm guidance.22 The reformers thus created a new vocabulary of
juvenile justice, one from which words like punishment, blame, and
responsibility were expunged.
Two related claims were at the heart of the rehabilitative model of
juvenile justice: that young offenders were misguided children rather than
17. Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503,
510-12 (1984) (citing 1 M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 22-26 (1778) and 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23-24 (1769)). A child between the ages of 7 and 14
could be convicted of a crime and subject to adult punishment if the prosecutor demonstrated that he
understood the wrongfulness of his conduct. Id. at 511. The test was similar to that of the
M'Naghten version of the insanity defense. Id. at 550.
18. Id. at510-12.
19. Toward the end of the 19th century, however, courts began to confine young offenders in
separate facilities called "houses of refuge." See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE
ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 207-09 (rev. ed. 1990).
20. See, e.g., MURRAY LEVINE & ADELINE LEVINE, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF HELPING
SERVICES: CLINIC, COURT, SCHOOL, AND COMMUNITY 155-58 (1970) (noting that the first true
juvenile court was established in Chicago in 1899 as a result of the efforts of the Chicago Womens'
Club and Jane Addams's Hull House).
21. The Progressive reform program aimed to establish broad-based paternalistic policies.
Other reforms included restrictions on child labor, school attendance laws, and the creation of a
child welfare system. For a discussion of Progressive-era reforms directed at children, see generally
LEVINE & LEVINE, supra note 20, at 23-24 (characterizing the 20th century as the "Century of the
Child" and describing the child welfare and service agencies created during the fin de siecle);
JOSEPH KETr, RITES OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERICA 1790 TO THE PRESENT 221-27
(1977).
22. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909).
23. See LEVINE & LEVINE, supra note 20, at 185-87; Mack, supra note 22, at 107 (describing
the purposes and procedures of the new court). For a narrative account of a court that embodied the
ideal, see BEN B. LINDSEY & HARVEY J. O'HIGGINS, THE BEAST (photo. reprint 1970) (1910).
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culpable wrongdoers, and that the sole purpose of state intervention was to
promote their welfare through rehabilitation.24 The first claim was supported
only by rhetoric: the conceptual architects of the court were not seriously
interested in the link between criminal responsibility and immaturity.25 This
idealized description of young lawbreakers may have made sense in light of
the reformers' political goals, but it came to seem naive and implausible-at
least as applied to older adolescents charged with serious crimes. As for the
second claim, the acceptance of the "wayward child" ideal likely was always
predicated on the promised effectiveness of rehabilitation in reducing youth
crime and protecting society. 26 As the 20th century progressed, both the re-
habilitative model and the image of the adolescent offender as a blameless
child were discredited.27
The collapse of the rehabilitative model of juvenile justice left
something of a conceptual vacuum. For a period in the 1970s and 1980s, it
seemed that a new model might emerge, one that avoided the traditional
rhetoric and grounded criminal responsibility in a more accurate account of
adolescence. During this period, reform groups designed regulatory frame-
works that combined proportionate juvenile justice dispositions with
interventions aimed at preparing young offenders for conventional adult
roles.28 State legislatures revised their juvenile justice codes to incorporate
24. A core tenet of the new court's philosophy (and key to the reformers' political strategy) was
that delinquent and neglected children were very similar and warranted similar treatment. Judge
Mack's famous challenge is representative: "Why is it not just and proper to treat these juvenile
offenders, as we deal with the neglected children, as a wise and merciful father handles his own
child whose errors are not discovered by the authorities?" See Mack, supra note 22, at 107.
25. In practice the image likely was always more rhetoric than substance. From the early years
of the juvenile court, youths who committed serious crimes were sent to correctional facilities. See
LINDSEY & O'HIGGINS, supra note 23.
26. As the Supreme Court noted, "the high crime rates among juveniles.., could not lead us to
conclude that ... the juvenile justice system, functioning free of constitutional inhibitions as it had
largely done, is effective to reduce crime or rehabilitate offenders." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22
(1967).
27. The rehabilitative model suffered both because little evidence suggested that it worked to
reduce crime and because it harmed the interests of young offenders. Gault made clear that the
rehabilitative model's failure to recognize adequately the state's interest in punishment and public
protection was the source of procedures and practices that deprived youngsters of the core
protections that adult defendants enjoyed, and that this ultimately harmed their interests. Id. at 25-
27. For a discussion of how juvenile court procedures and dispositional structure were grounded in
the rehabilitative model, see W. VAUGHAN STAPLETON & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF
YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 15-21 (1972)
(describing the theory of rehabilitation's reflection in the procedural scheme of the court). For a
scathing critique of the procedural structure of the juvenile court, see FRANCIS ALLEN, The Juvenile
Court and the Limits of Juvenile Justice, in THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 43-61 (1964).
See also LEVINE & LEVINE, supra note 20, at 11-21 (decrying the state of American mental health
treatment in general, and noting that although juvenile courts "were among the first institutions to
use psychiatric services," it eventually became rare for them to have treatment facilities).
28. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS (1978)
2003]
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accountability and public protection as policy objectives. 29 Before these
initiatives were effectively translated into a comprehensive modem youth
crime policy, however, they were overwhelmed by a new wave of reforms
under which young criminals increasingly were classified as adults.
The contemporary reforms were partly responsive to periods of
increased violent juvenile crime in the 1980s and early 1990s, a trend that
understandably generated intensified concern about public safety. 30  This
period was also marked by criticism of the juvenile court and a loss of con-
fidence in its capacity to serve young offenders and also effectively protect
the public. 31 Advocates for reform ridiculed the paternalistic rhetoric of the
traditional court; young offenders now were described as hardened criminals
and "superpredators. 32 Although this characterization has been challenged,
most participants in the debate seem to assume that young offenders either
will be treated as children in juvenile court or sent to prison to serve "adult
time for adult crime. 33 Given this choice, lawmakers and the public have
opted for public protection over leniency. 34 Legislatures across the country
have enacted statutes that lower the age at which youths can be tried and
punished as adults for an ever-broader range of crimes. 35 Underlying these
(describing a theory of juvenile sentencing based on diminished responsibility, combined with
policies that provided room to reform for young offenders); IJA-ABA JOINT COMMISSION ON
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS ET AL., JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS: STANDARDS RELATING TO
DISPOSITIONS, STANDARD 4.1 (1980) (giving adjudicated delinquents a right to services).
29. Many state legislatures revised the policy preambles of juvenile codes to emphasize that
accountability was an important purpose of juvenile sanctions. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
13.40.010(2)(a), (c) (West 1993 & Supp. 2001); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6301(b)(2) (West
2000).
30. The most alarming increase was in the rate of youth homicide, which doubled during this
period. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH VIOLENCE 35-38 (1998). Many observers
argue that the increased availability of guns played a large role. Id. at 35.
31. In one study in 1989, 70% of those questioned said that violent youth crime was caused by
lenient treatment in juvenile courts. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 157 (Timothy J. Flanagan & Kathleen Maguire,
eds. 1990) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK].
32. WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY... AND HOW TO WIN
AMERICA'S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 26-27 (1996).
33. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Youthful Indiscretions: Culture, Class Status, and the
Passage to Adulthood, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 744 (2002) (observing that prosecutors who fail to
abide by this political mantra may suffer on election day).
34. See Jane B. Sprott, Understanding Public Opposition to a Separate Youth Justice System,
44 CRIME & DELINQ. 399 (1998) (presenting a study that shows that the public supports prison for
juveniles because the juvenile system is too lenient). In a Gallup poll, 50% responded that juveniles
should get the same punishment as adults for their first offense. David W. Moore, Majority
Advocate Death Penalty for Teenage Killers, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Sept. 1994, at 2, 2-3.
35. During this period, most states lowered the age at which youths can be tried as adults, and
legislative waiver (mandating automatic adjudication in criminal court above the jurisdictional age
for some offenses) became more common. See Scott, Legal Construction, supra note 15, at 584-85
(noting a state legislative trend of lowering ages for transfer to adult court and increasing the types
of felonies which trigger transfer hearings, waiver statutes, and blended hearings); Thomas Grisso,
Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial, 12 CRIM. JUST. 4, 5-6 (1997) (stating that 90% of states have
revised juvenile codes). Some states adopted blended sentencing for serious offenses, under which
Blaming Youth
initiatives is an implicit assumption that young offenders-at least those
convicted of serious crimes-are fully responsible and can fairly be punished
as adults.3 6
B. Contemporary Justice Policy as Moral Panic
At one level, the story of the recent policy reforms is a simple one: the
rehabilitative model failed, violent juvenile crime increased, and rational
lawmakers responded by narrowing the domain of childhood in order to
protect public safety in the face of a growing threat. Closer scrutiny,
however, suggests that the recent trend is not simply a coherent response to
changing exigencies. Rather, it has features of what sociologists describe as
a moral panic, in which the media, politicians, and the public reinforce each
other in an escalating pattern of alarmed reaction to a perceived social
threat.37 The elements of a moral panic include an intense community
concern (often triggered by a publicized incident) that is focused on deviant
behavior, an exaggerated perception of the seriousness of the threat and the
number of offenders, and collective hostility toward the offenders, who are
perceived as outsiders threatening the community.38 Although the fervor
typically fades in a relatively short time, panics can effectively become
institutionalized if legal and policy changes result.
39
The response to juvenile crime over the past decade fits this pattern
well. The evidence suggests that public perceptions about the magnitude of
the threat are greatly exaggerated, and that the fears apparently have not been
allayed by a steady decrease in the rate of juvenile crime (including violent
youths would complete sentences in adult prison. Scott, supra note 15, at 584-85. In Texas, for
example, about two dozen felonies carry up to 40-year blended sentences. For a discussion of the
Texas reforms initiated in 1995 by Governor George Bush, see Paul Duggan, George Bush: The
Texas Record, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1999, at A].
36. See Brian Doherty, When Kids Kill: Blame Those Who Pull Trigger, MILWAUKEE J. &
SENTINEL, May 31, 1998, at I (advocating that children who commit crimes are to blame, not
others).
37. See generally ERICH GOODE & NACHMAN BEN-YEHUDA, MORAL PANICS: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF DEVIANCE (1994).
38. Id. at 31.
39. Id. at 31-45. Moral panics are not exclusively a modem phenomenon. Examples include
the Salem witch trials, prohibition, the public response to child sexual abuse in day care, and the
response to claims of satanic ritual abuse. Id. at 57-61. A good example of law reform as a
response to moral panic is the recent enactment of "Megan's Laws," under which many states now
require a wide range of convicted sex offenders to make their criminal history known to neighbors.
The first of such laws followed the killing of a New Jersey girl by a neighbor who was a sex
offender. See John Goldman, Sex Offender Guilty of Killing Megan Kanka, L.A. TIMES, May 31,
1997, at Al. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 (West 1995); Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case
for Megan's Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315, 317-18 (2001) ("Recently,
some commentators have suggested that Megan's Law reflects a recurring type of 'moral panic,' a
widespread, if overblown fear that the nation's children are at extreme risk." (citing PHILIP JENKINS,




crime) since the mid-1990s.40  Indeed, much of the "get tough" legislation
reclassifying juveniles charged with serious crimes has been enacted since
1995, after the crime rate began to decline.4' As in other moral panics,
politicians and the media have played key roles in stimulating public fears,
and the public has reacted by demanding greater protection through tougher
legislation. The process often seems to be triggered by high profile juvenile
crimes, such as school shootings or other violent crimes with child victims.
42
Although such incidents are uncommon, they are publicized vividly and
repeatedly by the media and become highly salient reminders of the terrible
costs of youth crime. Through processes familiar to cognitive psychologists,
collective perceptions of the threat become distorted, as alarmed public
discourse is reinforced by vivid images of the crime and the victims.
43
This account, although it sheds light on the recent changes in public and
political opinion and the resulting law reforms, does not fully explain the
40. Surveys reveal that Americans believe that juveniles are responsible for a far greater portion
of crime than is in fact the case. See Moore, supra note 34, at 2 (presenting a poll which found that,
on average, participants believed that juveniles are responsible for 43% of violent crime, three times
the actual percent). The high rates of juvenile homicide, which fueled the punitive trend, declined
steeply beginning in the mid-1990s. See ZIMRING, supra note 30, at 36 (presenting graphic
evidence of the drop); Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Recapturing the Child in Adult Court, 16 CRIM.
JUST. 58, 58 (2002) (describing the continuing public misperception that an "epidemic" of juvenile
crime exists, despite the actual decline in juvenile crime rates).
41. For example, in 2000, when the rate of violent juvenile crime in California was lower than
it had been in years, a large majority of California voters passed Proposition 21, mandating adult
criminal prosecutions of 14-year-olds for a wide variety of offenses. See Jim McLain, System
Bracing for Kids in Adult Courts, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Mar. 16, 2000, at AI (discussing the
predicted impact of broader prosecutorial authority under Proposition 21 to charge juveniles as
adults); see also George Mgdesyan, Gang Violence and Crime Prevention Act of 1998, 3 J. LEGAL
ADVOC. & PRAc. 128, 136-37 (citing statistics showing a 30% drop in California's juvenile felony
arrest rate and a 50% drop in arrests for homicide between 1990 and 2000).
42. Fears that children are at risk often trigger moral panics. See supra note 39. In response to
the killings of several students and a middle school teacher by 11- and 13-year-old boys, the
Arkansas legislature lowered the age at which youths can be tried as adults. Chauncey E. Brummer,
Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction: The Best of Both Worlds?, 54 ARK. L. REV. 777, 806-10 (2002).
43. The public response can be understood as involving a familiar cognitive bias described by
psychologists as the availability heuristic. Availability can lead individuals to exaggerate the
likelihood of salient events that can be readily brought to mind. See Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 11 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). Timur Kuran and
Cass Sunstein argue that this bias is key to understanding how public perceptions of risk become
exaggerated, and they offer many examples of the phenomenon. See generally Timur Kuran &
Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999)
(describing the public responses to the Love Canal incident and the pesticide alar as examples of
exaggerated perceptions of risk). In the context of youth crime, the text suggests how public
perceptions of the threat are amplified by extensive coverage in the media, and attention by
politicians, experts, and the public. Under the Kuran-Sunstein model, a cascade of collective
opinion is triggered as individuals are persuaded of the seriousness of the threat, and then they too
join in the outcry. Those who are skeptical may remain silent rather than voicing unpopular
opinions and risking social disapproval. In this view, public opinion based on distorted perceptions
gains momentum and contributes to public pressure on politicians and policy-makers to
institutionalize the public's concerns by enacting legislation that responds to the threat.
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current hostility toward young offenders and readiness to punish them as
adults. The recent trend represents a shift in attitude in a relatively short
period of time,44 and it stands in sharp contrast to paternalistic social attitudes
and legal policies toward children and adolescents in virtually every other
context.45  The pervasive assumption that adolescents are incapable of
making competent decisions and should be protected from their own im-
mature judgment is readily set aside when the question is whether young
lawbreakers should be held fully responsible for their crimes. It is ironic, for
example, that while Lionel Tate can be sentenced to life in prison, he cannot
work, execute a binding contract, or make other important decisions on his
own behalf.46
A troubling explanation for the puzzling hostility toward young law
violators is that attitudes are driven by racial and ethnic bias. Minority
youths are disproportionately represented in the justice system,47 and it is
likely that many people envision young criminals as members of minority
groups. If so, racial stereotypes may override conventional paternalistic
attitudes about minors. If people do not identify young offenders as "kids,"
because they are not their kids, they may react with an unsympathetic
44. For example, Gallup polls in the 1950s showed strong opposition to imposing the death
penalty on juveniles-in contrast to more recent polls. See Moore, supra note 34, at 2, 4
(presenting a 1994 poll showing that 60% favor the death penalty for teenage murderers, in contrast
to 11% in 1957). More lenient attitudes toward young offenders began to harden in the 1980s, and
today there is substantial public support for punishing young offenders as adults. See, e.g.,
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 31 (examining a national study in which 65% of respondents favored
treating juveniles accused of violent crimes the same as adults); Moore, supra note 34, at 3
(presenting a Gallup poll that shows 50% support for treating juveniles as adults for a first offense;
83% for second or third offense); Jane B. Sprott, Understanding Public Views of Youth Crime and
the Youth Justice System, 38 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 271, 281-85 (1996) (describing a Canadian
study in which 88% of respondents believed juvenile court sentences were "too lenient" and 57% of
this subset of respondents also opposed having a separate juvenile justice system).
45. See Scott, Legal Construction, supra note 15, at 550-57 (describing entrenched paternalism
in legal regulation of minors).
46. Cf Sylvia Law, Families and Federalism, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 175, 207 (2000)
(noting that a primary argument for the adoption of the 26th Amendment was that if 18 was old
enough to fight and die in Vietnam, it was also old enough to vote).
47. See TERRENCE P. THORNBERRY ET AL., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE PREVENTION,
CHILDREN IN CUSTODY 7 (1991) (reporting that minorities represented the majority of children
detained in public facilities in 1987); OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQ. PREVENTION,
JUSTICE REFORM INITIATIVES IN THE STATES: 1994-1996 PROGRAM REPORT 4 (1997) (reporting
that black juveniles made up 12.5% of the population in 1994, but accounted for nearly 29% of
juvenile arrests, and more than half of the arrests for violent crime, including 59% of juvenile
homicide arrests). Evaluating disproportionate representation of minority youths in the justice
system is a tricky business. Most analysts believe that the phenomenon reflects both higher
offending rates and differential responses to minority and white youths by system participants,
including police, prosecutors, judges, and corrections officers. See Donna M. Bishop & Charles E.
Frazier, The Influence of Race in Juvenile Justice Processing, 25 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 242,
242-58 (1998) (indicating that African-American youths "are more likely to be recommended for




detachment that is not usually directed toward youth. Through this lens,
young law violators are simply criminals, and harsh punishment is the right
response to their crimes.
Many observers argue that racial and ethnic bias plays a pervasive, if
largely invisible, role in shaping public attitudes toward young offenders, and
that it also influences the responses of the media, politicians, and actors in
the justice system. Although the extent to which prejudice shapes opinion
and practice is quite uncertain, the research evidence supports the view that it
plays a pernicious role. 48 African-American youths are perceived as being
more mature, more dangerous, and more deserving of punishment than are
comparable white youths.49 Indifference to immaturity as a factor in criminal
punishment becomes less of a puzzle in a social context in which the justice
system disproportionately deals with minority youths, and those youths are
deemed to represent a substantial threat to society.
This account of the formulation of modem juvenile justice policy
suggests that it is a politicized process, driven by distorted perceptions of the
threat and possibly by illegitimate social attitudes. These deficiencies are
troubling in themselves and warrant remedial attention. They are also
symptomatic of a deeper deficiency, which is that contemporary youth crime
policy lacks a theory and a conceptual framework in which regulation can be
formulated and evaluated. Ironically, this void was created in large part by
the dominance during the 20th century of a model of juvenile justice that
rejected the relevance of criminal law doctrine and principles to delinquency
dispositions. With the discrediting of the rehabilitative model, contemporary
lawmakers have created a regime for punishing immature lawbreakers that is
driven by political forces, unconstrained by the conventional limits on pun-
48. See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 47, at 258. A 2000 Michigan State University study
comparing white to Latino youths found sentencing disparities for similar drug crimes. See
FRANCISCO A. VILLARRUEL ET AL., D6NDE ESTA LA JUSTICIA? A CALL TO ACTION ON BEHALF OF
LATINO AND LATINA YOUTH IN THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM 27-28, available at
http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/Full%20Report%20English.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
The research suggests that the media plays a role in reinforcing racial bias. Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr.
& Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local Television News on the Viewing Public,
44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 560 (2000) (presenting a study that shows that "crime script" of local television
news, in which race and violence are prominent, increases hostility among white viewers toward
African-Americans). See generally MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 134-48 (1995) (describing the vastly higher crime rates among poor
minorities).
49. Some of the evidence of racial bias is indirect. See supra note 47. Other evidence is more
direct. George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of Juvenile
Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 554,
561-64 (1998) (presenting a study which shows that probation officers were more likely to make
internal (character-related) attributions for the offenses of black juveniles, and external
(environmental) attributions for the crimes of white juveniles); Sandra Graham, Racial Stereotypes
in the Juvenile Justice System, Presentation at Conference of American Psychology-Law Society
(Mar. 9, 2002) (transcript on file with authors) (showing that law enforcement subjects who were
unconsciously primed to expect that a perpetrator in a crime vignette was African-American were
harsher in their judgments of the perpetrator's culpability and deserved punishment).
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ishment embedded in the criminal law. In sharp contrast to the complex
elaboration of excuse and mitigation generally found in the criminal law,
little is offered when it comes to how the condition of immaturity should
affect punishment,50 and no contemporary framework has replaced the
traditional rehabilitative model.
II. Adolescent Development and Involvement in Crime
In order to construct a modem juvenile justice framework, we first
examine the attributes of childhood and adolescence that distinguish young
offenders from their adult counterparts in ways that are relevant to their
criminal choices. Scientists who study adolescence view this stage as a
bridge between childhood and adulthood-a period during which various
decisionmaking capacities develop, although not at a uniform rate. By mid-
adolescence, cognitive capacities for reasoning and understanding are prob-
ably close to those of adults, although teens are likely less skilled in using
these capacities to make real-life decisions. 51 In psycho-social development,
however, teens mature more slowly. This contributes to what in common
parlance would be called immature judgment-the tendency of adolescents
to make choices that may be harmful to themselves or others.52 The ways in
which psycho-social factors influence decisionmaking and the kinds of
50. Consider, for example, the relationship between mental disorder and criminal responsibility.
Several versions of the insanity defense have been offered over the past 150 years, and courts and
commentators have explored the extent to which mental illness can mitigate blameworthiness under
doctrines such as diminished capacity. See generally BONNIE ET AL., supra note 5, at 445-56, 477-
502 (discussing the ways the law has defined the relationship between mental abnormality and
criminal responsibility). Mental disorder as an excuse from criminal responsibility has been a topic
of great interest to criminal law scholars. See generally JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVNG:
ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 272-92 (1970) (arguing that "mental illness has an
independent significance for questions of responsibility not fully accounted for by reference to its
power to deprive one of the capacity to be law-abiding"); MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND
PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 217-24 (1984) (discussing madness as an excuse
for criminal activity); NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982) (exploring
madness and the law through numerous fictional scenarios). Although mental disorder and
immaturity (insanity and infancy) are often classified together as excuses based on endogenous
incapacity, immaturity is ignored in the literature of criminal responsibility. Criminal law theorists
assume without inquiry that the immaturity of youth functions to mitigate or excuse young actors
from responsibility for their crimes, but they also appear to assume that this conclusion has little
contemporary importance in criminal law, perhaps because they believe that youths continue to be
dealt with in a separate justice system in which their reduced blameworthiness is recognized (as was
historically true). See Duff, supra note 7, at 351-55 (focusing on insanity as an excuse with no
mention of immaturity); Kadish, supra note 10, at 262, 278-81 (mentioning infancy as a non-
responsibility excuse and analyzing the non-responsibility excuse with a focus on insanity); Moore,
supra note 7, at 31 (mentioning infancy as a status excuse).
51. In part, adolescents lack skills in decisionmaking because they lack the experience of adults.
Individuals are better able to use complex reasoning abilities in familiar situations. See Shawn C.
Ward & Willis F. Overton, Semantic Familiarity, Relevance, and the Development of Deductive
Reasoning, 26 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 488, 492 (1990).
52. Scott et al., supra note 6, at 223; Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 6, at 267-68.
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choices adolescents make depend, in part, on the social context in which they
find themselves. Adolescence is also a stage of individuation and identity
formation, processes closely linked to psycho-social development.
Individuals do not develop a coherent sense of identity until young
adulthood, and adolescence is characterized by exploration, experimentation,
and fluctuations in self-image. This movement from a fluid and embryonic
sense of identity to one that is more stable and well-developed includes
developments in the realms of morality, values, and beliefs. 3
In this Part, we examine the dimensions of psychological and social
development that provide the basis of our claim that adolescent involvement
in crime differs from that of adults in ways that are important to assessments
of culpability. First, several features of cognitive and psycho-social
development in adolescence undermine competent decisionmaking and dis-
tinguish youths from adults. Second, the relationship between psycho-social
development and the forming of personal identity in adolescence is important
to understanding unique features of youthful criminal activity. Our analysis
explains that typical adolescent criminal conduct is qualitatively different
from that of adults because it is driven by developmental forces that are
constitutive of this developmental stage.
A. Cognitive and Psycho-Social Development
Understanding and Reasoning.-The most familiar factors related to
decisionmaking capacity are reasoning and understanding, basic elements of
cognitive development. These capacities increase through childhood into
adolescence; thus, pre-adolescents and younger teens differ substantially
from adults in their cognitive abilities (although there is great variability
among individuals). These developments, described in rich detail by Jean
Piaget and subsequent researchers in cognitive development, are undergirded
by increases in specific and general knowledge gained through education and
experience, and by improvements in basic information-processing skills,
including attention, short- and long-term memory, and organization.
5 4
By mid-adolescence, tentative scientific evidence supports the claim
that adolescents' capacities for understanding and reasoning in making
decisions roughly approximate those of adults. 5 These findings from lab-
53. LAURENCE STEINBERG, ADOLESCENCE 263-65 (5th ed. 1999) (summarizing research on
the development of moral reasoning, religious beliefs, and political views, and indicating a
consolidation of values during the middle and late adolescent years).
54. The key advances during this period are gains in deductive reasoning, the ability to think
about hypothetical situations, the ability to think simultaneously in multiple dimensions, the ability
to think abstractly, and the ability to think about the process of thinking ("metacognition"). See
JOHN H. FLAVELL ET AL., COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT (3d ed. 1993) (outlining Piaget's theory and
updating it based on new data); BARBEL INHELDER & JEAN PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL
THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE (1958); JEAN PIAGET, GENETIC EPISTEMOLOGY
(1970); ROBERT S. SIEGLER, CHILDREN'S THINKING 55 (2d ed. 1991).
55. The evidence is tentative for two reasons. First, it is based in part on Piaget's stage theory
of cognitive development, which has been challenged by modem cognitive scientists. Cognitive
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oratory studies are only modestly useful, however, in understanding how
youths compare to adults in making choices that have salience to their lives
or that are presented in stressful unstructured settings (such as the street) in
which decisionmakers must rely on personal experience and knowledge.56
For these reasons, it remains uncertain whether adolescent cognitive
capacity-as it affects choices relevant to criminal conduct-is comparable
to that of adults.
Judgment Factors in Decisionmaking.-Psycho-social development
proceeds more slowly than cognitive development. As a consequence, even
when adolescent cognitive capacities approximate those of adults, youthful
decisionmaking may still differ due to immature judgment. The psycho-
social factors most relevant to differences in judgment include: (a) peer
orientation, (b) attitudes toward and perception of risk, (c) temporal
perspective, and (d) capacity for self-management. 57  While cognitive
capacities shape the process of decisionmaking, immature judgment can
affect outcomes because these developmental factors influence adolescent
values and preferences that drive the cost-benefit calculus in the making of
choices.
Substantial research evidence supports the conventional wisdom that
teens are more responsive to peer influence than are adults. Susceptibility to
peer influence increases between childhood and early adolescence as ado-
lescents begin to individuate from parental control. This susceptibility peaks
around age fourteen and declines slowly during the high-school years.f8 Peer
psychologists now accept that skills develop at different rates in different domains, and competence
to make one kind of decision cannot be generalized. See FLAVELL, supra note 54; SIEGLER, supra
note 54, at 51 (arguing that subsequent data fails to support the stage theory assumption of
concurrent development in reasoning). Second, as the text suggests, the claim is tentative because it
is supported by a group of small research studies conducted in laboratory settings that for the most
part involved white middle class subjects and no adult control groups. These studies are discussed
and critiqued in Scott et al., supra note 6, at 224-26. For a thoughtful scientific critique of claims
that youths' decisionmaking capacities are adultlike, see William Gardner et al., Asserting Scientific
Authority: Cognitive Development and Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 895, 900-
01 (1989).
56. Research generally indicates that there is often a gap between intellectual competence and
performance; performance is affected by a host of factors, including familiarity with the content
area of the task. For example, if the task used to measure intellectual competence involves the
reading of text about airplanes, then familiarity with airplanes may affect the performance of the
person being tested. See generally Ward & Overton, supra note 51.
57. See generally Scott et al., supra note 6, 232-35 (exploring the effects of temporal
perspective, attitude toward risk, and peer and parental influence on decisionmaking); Steinberg &
Cauffman, supra note 6, 267-68 (examining research and theory regarding responsibility,
temperance, and perspective as characteristics of mature judgment).
58. See Laurence Steinberg & Susan B. Silverberg, The Vicissitudes of Autonomy in Early
Adolescence, 57 CHILD DEV. 841, 848 (1986) (presenting research showing age differences in
susceptibility to peer pressure); Scott et al., supra note 6, at 229-30; Steinberg & Cauffman, supra
note 6, at 257-59. Changes in susceptibility to peer pressure may reflect changes in individuals'
capacity for self-direction or, as some theorists have suggested, changes in the intensity of pressure
that adolescents exert on each other. B. Bradford Brown, Peer Groups and Peer Cultures, in AT
20031
Texas Law Review
influence affects adolescent judgment both directly and indirectly.59 In some
contexts, adolescents might make choices in response to direct peer pressure.
More indirectly, adolescents' desire for peer approval (and fear of rejection)
affects their choices, even without direct coercion. Finally, peers may
provide models for behavior that adolescents believe will assist them to
accomplish their own ends.
Future orientation, the capacity and inclination to project events into the
future, may also influence judgment, since it will affect the extent to which
individuals consider the long-term consequences of their actions in making
choices. Over an extended period between childhood and young adulthood,
individuals become more future-oriented. 60 Adolescents tend to discount the
future more than adults do, and to weigh more heavily short-term con-
sequences of decisions-both risks and benefits-in making choices.6'
There are several plausible explanations for this age gap in future orientation.
First, owing to cognitive limitations in their ability to think hypothetically,
adolescents simply may be less able than adults to think about events that
have not yet occurred (i.e., events that may occur sometime in the future).
Second, adolescents' weaker future orientation may reflect their more limited
life experience. For adolescents, a consequence five years in the future may
seem very remote, while a short-term consequence may be valued dispro-
portionately due to its immediacy.62
Research evidence also suggests that adolescents differ from adults in
their perception of, and attitude toward, risk.63 It is well established that
THE THRESHOLD: THE DEVELOPING ADOLESCENT 171 (S. Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds.,
1990).
59. Susceptibility to peer influence involves two processes: social comparison and conformity.
N. SPRINTHALL & W.A. COLLINS, ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY: A DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW 269
(1988). Through social comparison, adolescents measure their own behavior by comparing it to
others. Id. Conformity influences adolescents to adapt their behavior and attitudes to that of their
peers. Id. at 272. Substantial research supports these influences. See also Thomas J. Berndt,
Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers and Parents, 15 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 608
(1979) (discussing studies which measure the effects of age on peer and parental conformity); Philip
R. Costanzo & Marvin E. Shaw, Conformity as a Function ofAge Level, 37 CHILD DEV. 967 (1966)
(confirming hypothesis that conformity increases up to adolescence and declines afterwards).
60. See Anita Greene, Future Time Perspective in Adolescence: The Present of Things Future
Revisited, 15 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 99 (1986) (presenting a study showing improvement over
the course of adolescence in the ability to project events into the future); Jari-Erik Nurmi, How Do
Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of the Development of Future Orientation and Planning,
11 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1 (1991) (reviewing literature on future orientation and finding capacity
increases over the course of adolescence). Gains take place over an extended period between the
ages of I 1 and 18 in individuals' capacities to project various events into the future. Id. at 29.
61. See William Gardner & Janna Herman, Adolescents'AIDS Risk Taking: A Rational Choice
Perspective, in ADOLESCENTS IN THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 24 (William Gardner et al. eds., 1990)
(arguing that adolescents may be more likely to engage in unprotected sex because they discount
long-term consequences).
62. William Gardner, A Life-Span Rational-Choice Theory of Risk Taking, in ADOLESCENT
RISK TAKING 78-79 (Nancy J. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993).
63. Gardner & Herman, supra note 61, at 25-26; Michael L. Matthews & Andrew R. Moran,
Age Differences in Male Drivers' Perception of Accident Risk: The Role of Perceived Driving
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adolescents and young adults generally take more health and safety risks than
do older adults by engaging more frequently in behaviors such as unprotected
sex, drunk driving, and criminal conduct.64 Moreover, a synergy likely exists
between adolescent peer orientation and risk-taking; considerable evidence
indicates that people generally make riskier decisions in groups than they do
alone. 65 In general, adolescents are less risk-averse than adults, generally
weighing rewards more heavily than risks in making choices.66 In part, this
may be due to limits on youthful time perspective; taking risks is more costly
for those who focus on the future. Finally, adolescents may have different
values and goals than do adults, leading them to calculate risks and rewards
differently. For example, the danger of risk-taking could constitute a reward
for an adolescent but a cost to an adult.
67
The widely held stereotype that adolescents are more impulsive than
adults is supported by the relatively sparse research on developmental
changes in impulsivity and self-management over the course of adolescence.
In general, studies show gradual but steady increases in individuals' capacity
for self-direction throughout the adolescent years, with gains continuing
through the final years of high school.68 Impulsivity, as a general trait,
increases between middle adolescence and early adulthood and declines
thereafter, as does sensation-seeking. 69 Research also indicates that ado-
lescents have more rapid and more extreme mood swings (both positive and
negative) than adults,70 although the connection between moodiness and
impulsivity is not clear. While more research is needed, the available
evidence supports the notion that adolescents may have more difficulty
regulating their moods, impulses, and behaviors than do adults.
Ability, 18 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 299, 309-11 (1986); Maya Tester et al.,
Experimental Studies of the Development of Decision-making Competence, in CHILDREN, RISKS,
AND DECISIONS: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS (Symposium materials, Annual
Convention of the Am. Psychological Ass'n, New York, Aug. 1987); Scott et al., supra note 6, at
230.
64. See Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Decision-Making
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 1, 1-2 (1992) (presenting a rational-decisionmaking model
of adolescent risky behavior).
65. This phenomenon is known as the "risky-shift" and has been observed in adults (who are
less subject to peer influence and less likely to make decisions in groups). Jerald M. Jellison &
John Riskind, Attribution of Risk to Others as a Function of Their Ability, 20 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 413 (1971).
66. Gardner & Herman, supra note 61, at 25-26.
67. Moreover, peer rejection (for not taking risks) is likely to be weighed more heavily by teens
than adults.
68. Ellen Greenberger, Education and the Acquisition of Psycho-social Maturity, in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL MATURITY (David C. McClelland ed., 1982) (showing gradual gains in
self-reliance over the course of adolescence).
69. Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 6, at 260.
70. Reed Larson et al., Mood Variability and the Psycho-Social Adjustment of Adolescents, 9 J.
YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 469, 488 (1980) (presenting a study finding wider mood fluctuations
among adolescents than adults).
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Although most of the developmental research on cognitive and psycho-
social functioning involves psychological studies, mounting evidence
suggests that some of the differences between adults and adolescents have an
organic dimension. Research on brain development, although in its early
stages, indicates that regions of the brain implicated in processes of long-
term planning, regulation of emotion, impulse control, and the evaluation of
risk and reward continue to mature over the course of adolescence, and
perhaps well into young adulthood. 71 At puberty, changes in the limbic
system-a part of the brain that is central in the processing and regulation of
emotion-may stimulate adolescents to seek higher levels of novelty and to
take more risks; these changes may also contribute to increased emotionality
and vulnerability to stress. 72 At the same time, patterns of development in
the prefrontal cortex, which is active during the performance of complicated
tasks involving planning and decisionmaking, suggest that these higher-order
cognitive capacities may be immature well into middle adolescence.73 One
scientist has likened the psychological consequences of brain development in
adolescence to "starting the engines without a skilled driver.
'7 4
For most adolescents, the characteristic developmental influences on
decisionmaking will change in predictable ways. As the typical adolescent
matures into adulthood, he becomes a more experienced and competent
decisionmaker; susceptibility to peer influence attenuates, risk perception
improves, risk averseness increases, time perspective expands to focus more
on long-term consequences, and self-management improves. These develop-
ments lead to changes in values and preferences. As adolescents become
adults, they are likely to make different choices from their youthful selves,
choices that reflect more mature judgment.
1. Developmental Factors and Criminal Decisionmaking.-How might
developmental factors that contribute to immature judgment influence young
actors to participate in criminal activity?
75 Consider the following scenario.7
6
A teen hangs out with his buddies on the street, when, on the spur of the
71. Patricia Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS 417 (2000) (reviewing animal and human research on
brain maturation during puberty and indicating that "remodelling of the brain" during adolescence
occurs among different species).
72. Id. at421.
73. Id. at 423.
74. Ronald Dahl, Affect Regulation, Brain Development, and Behavioral/Emotional Health in
Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 60 (2001).
75. For an analysis of the impact of cognitive and psycho-social immaturity on adolescent
decisionmaking generally, see Elizabeth S. Scott, Reasoning and Judgment in Adolescent
Decisionmaking, 37 VILLANOVA L. REV. 1607, 1647-57 (1992).
76. The scenario in the text is adapted from Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution
of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 137, 165-66 (1997).
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moment, someone suggests holding up a nearby convenience store. The
youth doesn't really go through a formal decisionmaking process, but he
"chooses" to go along, even if he has mixed feelings. Why? First and most
important, he may assume that his friends will reject him if he declines to
participate-a negative consequence to which he attaches considerable
weight in considering alternatives. He does not think of options to extricate
himself-although a more mature person might do so. This may be because
he lacks experience, because the choice is made so quickly, or because he has
difficulty projecting the course of events into the future. Also, the
"adventure" of the hold-up and the possibility of getting some money are
exciting. These immediate rewards (together with peer approval) weigh more
heavily in his decision than the remote possibility of apprehension by the
police. He never considers the long-term costs of committing a serious
crime.
Research on youthful criminal activity offers some empirical support for
this scenario. For example, unlike adult criminals, adolescents usually
commit crimes with peers,77 although the precise mechanisms by which peer
orientation shapes criminal behavior are not well understood. Researchers
have also linked desistance from crime in late adolescence to improved
future orientation and to changing patterns of peer relationships.78 The
scenario is also consistent with the general developmental research on peer
influence, risk preference, impulsivity, and future orientation, and it suggests
how factors that are known to affect adolescent decisionmaking in general
are likely to operate in this setting. As a general proposition, teens are in-
clined to engage in risky behaviors that reflect their immaturity of judgment.
It seems very likely that the psycho-social influences shaping adolescents'
decisionmaking in other settings contribute to their choices about criminal
activity as well.
2. Psycho-Social Development in Social Context.-The psycho-social
factors that influence decisionmaking are an important component of
youthful criminal choices. Whether teens become involved in crime, and
what crimes they commit depend on other ingredients as well, including
77. Albert Reiss, Jr. & David Farrington, Advancing Knowledge About Co-Offending: Results
from a Prospective Longitudinal Survey of London Males, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 360,
361-62 (1991). Even adults, however, can make riskier choices in groups. Consider mob behavior,
for example.
78. See Edward Mulvey & John F. LaRosa, Delinquency Cessation and Adolescent
Development, 56 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 212, 222 (1986) (contending that cognitive changes
and increased awareness of consequences account for improved decisionmaking by troubled youths,
rather than drastic life-changing events). Terrie Moffitt postulates that young adults may cease to
commit crimes because they come to understand that the decision to offend carries the risk of lost
future opportunities. Terrie Moffitt, Adolescent-Limited and Life Course Persistent Antisocial
Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REv. 674, 690 (1993).
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opportunity and social context.79 Adolescent peer orientation makes youths
who live in high-crime neighborhoods susceptible to powerful pressures to
join in criminal activity, and compliance may be more typical than resistance.
Jeffrey Fagan and others have described how strong social norms within
urban adolescent male subcultures prescribe a set of attitudes and behaviors
that often lead to violent crime. 80 Moreover, avoiding confrontation when
challenged by a rival results in a loss of social status and ostracism by peer
affiliates, which in itself can create vulnerability to physical attack.8' The
research by Fagan and his colleagues suggests that ordinary youths in poor
urban neighborhoods face coercive peer pressure and sometimes tangible
threats that propel them to get involved in crime while making extrication
difficult.82
The coercive impact of social context is exacerbated because
adolescents are subject to legal and practical restrictions on their ability to
escape these criminogenic settings. Financially dependent on their parents or
guardians and subject to their legal authority, adolescents cannot escape their
homes, schools, and neighborhoods. At least until age sixteen, a web of legal
restrictions on their liberty prevents adolescents from doing what we might
expect of an adult in the same context-move to another location in which
the pressures to offend are lessened. Because adolescents lack legal and
practical autonomy, they are in a real sense trapped in whatever social setting
they occupy and are more restricted in their capacity to avoid coercive
criminogenic influences than are adults.
83
79. Jens Ludwig et al., Urban Poverty and Juvenile Crime, 116 Q. J. ECON. 655, 676 (2001)
(concluding that giving families the opportunity to move from high-poverty to low-poverty areas
reduces juvenile involvement in violent crime).
80. Jeffrey Fagan, Context and Culpability in Adolescent Crime, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 507,
535-38 (1999) (noting that coercive social context influences criminal choices); Jeffrey Fagan,
Contexts of Choice by Adolescents in Criminal Events, in YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 3, at 376
(arguing that social context predicts violent adolescent behavior); Deanna Wilkinson & Jeffrey
Fagan, The Role of Firearms in Violence "Scripts": The Dynamics of Gun Events Among Adolescent
Males, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 64-66 (1996). Wilkinson and Fagan describe the way in
which the peer social context coerces youths to follow set "scripts" that can lead to violent
confrontation. Id. Conformity to these social norms is then enforced with the threat of severe
sanctions. Id. at 63-64.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. At some level, many adult criminals can point to the impact of social context on their
involvement in crime. Arguments that the actor's "rotten social background" is exculpatory also
focus on such constraints. See generally Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should
the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9
(1985). However, the formal legal and structural restrictions on minors (which are removed when




B. The Formation of Personal Identity and Experimentation in Crime
The emergence of personal identity is an important developmental
function of adolescence, and one in which the aspects of psycho-social
development discussed earlier play a key role. During this period, youths
begin to separate from their parents and take steps toward an autonomous
personhood. Developmental psychologists describe two interrelated
processes: individuation (the process of establishing autonomy from one's
parents), and identity development(the process of creating a coherent and
integrated sense of self).84 A predictable developmental sequence can be
described. Most pre-adolescents strive to please their parents and other
adults by complying with their wishes and parroting adult beliefs and values.
During early and middle adolescence, youths individuate from parents, a
process that can involve a certain amount of risky behavior reflecting
rebellion and a shift in orientation from parents to peers. By late
adolescence, individuation is complete, autonomy from both parental and
peer influence is achieved, and the individual is well on the way toward the
establishment of personal identity.
85
Adolescence has often been described as a period of "identity crisis"-
an ongoing struggle to achieve self-definition. 86 According to developmental
theory, the process of identity development is a lengthy one that involves
considerable exploration and experimentation with different behaviors and
identity "elements." These elements include both superficial characteristics,
such as style of dress, appearance, or manner of speaking, and deeper
phenomena, such as personality traits, attitudes, values, and beliefs. As the
individual experiments, she gauges the reactions of others as well as her own
satisfaction, and through a process of trial and error, over time selects and
integrates the identity elements of a realized self. Not surprisingly, given
adolescent risk preferences (perhaps combined with rebellion against
parental values in the course of individuation), identity experimentation often
involves risky, illegal, or dangerous activities-alcohol use, drug use, unsafe
sex, delinquent conduct, and the like. For most teens, this experimentation is
fleeting; it ceases with maturity as identity becomes settled. Only a relatively
84. See Peter Blos, The Second Individuation Process of Adolescence, 22 THE
PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD 162-68 (1967) (describing individuation in early
adolescence). The most influential writing on the development of identity in adolescence is ERIK H.
ERIKSON, IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS (1968).
85. ERIKSON, supra note 84, at 136. Although both processes are ongoing throughout this
period, individuation is a more salient task in early and middle adolescence (when individuals
struggle for independence from parental control), while identity development is more important in
late adolescence and young adulthood. See Alan S. Waterman, Identity Development from
Adolescence to Adulthood An Extension of Theory and a Review of Research, 18 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 341, 345-48 (1982) (reviewing research on identity development); STEINBERG, supra
note 53, at 256-64, 278-99 (describing the development of identity and autonomy).
86. See generally ERIKSON, supra note 84, 15-19.
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small proportion of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal activities
develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior that persist into
adulthood.87 Thus, predicting the development of relatively more permanent
and enduring traits on the basis of risky behavior patterns observed in
adolescence is an uncertain business.
While individuation, exploration, and experimentation are ongoing from
early adolescence, coherent integration of the various retained elements of
identity into a developed "self' does not occur until late adolescence or early
adulthood. 8  Elements of adult personhood include social and political
attitudes, moral values, occupational commitments, religious beliefs, and
personal habits and lifestyle choices. 89 Until at least late adolescence, the
values, attitudes, beliefs, and plans expressed by adolescents are likely to be
tentative and exploratory expressions, rather than enduring representations of
personhood.
This account of identity development in adolescence informs our
understanding of patterns of criminal conduct among teens. Criminal be-
havior is rare in childhood and early adolescence. Onset typically occurs
during a period in which adolescents separate from parents and parental
influence, and become more focused on peers. The incidence of antisocial
behavior increases through age sixteen and declines sharply from age
seventeen onward. 90 Most teenage males engage in some criminal activity;
indeed, psychologist Terrie Moffitt describes it as "a normal part of teen
life." 91 However, only a small group of young offenders will persist in a life
of crime. 92 Based on these patterns, Moffitt offers a taxonomy of adolescent
87. See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
88. See ERIKSON, supra note 84, at 70; Waterman, supra note 85, at 345-48. Early descriptions
of the identity crisis of adolescence did not distinguish among early, middle, and late adolescence;
Erikson described adolescence as a single period of development. ERIKSON, supra note 84, at 128-
35. Empirical research suggests, however, that most identity development occurs late in the
adolescent period. Compare generally ERIKSON, supra note 84, with research reviewed by
STEINBERG, supra note 53, at 273-79.
89. See STEINBERG, supra note 53, at 263-64 (reviewing research indicating that the
development of a coherent sense of identity in the areas of ideological values and beliefs,
occupational commitments, and interpersonal relations does not typically occur before age 18).
90. RICHARD JESSOR & SHIRLEY L. JESSOR, PROBLEM BEHAVIOR AND PSYCHOSOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF YOUTH 145-63 (1977); David P. Farrington,
Offending from 10 to 25 Years of Age, in PROSPECTIVE STUDIES OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 17
(K. Teilman Van Deusen & S.A. Mednick eds., 1983); Moffitt, supra note 78, at 675.
91. Moffitt, supra note 78, at 675.
92. Much research supports this statement. See David P. Farrington, Age and Crime, in 7
CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 189 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris
eds., 1986) (describing declining crime rate in late adolescence); Edward P. Mulvey & Mark Aber,
Growing Out of Delinquency: Development and Desistance, in THE ABANDONMENT OF
DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR: PROMOTING THE TURNAROUND 99, 100 (Richard L. Jenkins & Waln K.
Brown eds., 1988) (describing a "natural onset and recovery process"); MARTIN WOLFGANG ET AL.,
DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 89 (1972) (reporting that a small fraction of the cohort persists
in crime); Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Characterizing Criminal Careers, 237 SCI. 985,
991 (1987) (pointing out that after age twenty, "participation levels continue to decline"); Travis
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antisocial conduct, in which typical teenage lawbreakers are described as
"adolescence-limited" offenders, while a much smaller group are described
as "life-course-persistent" offenders.93 Most youths in the first group have
little notable history of antisocial conduct in childhood, and, predictably, in
late adolescence or early adulthood, they will "mature out" of their
inclination to get involved in criminal activity.
This pattern supports the conclusion that much youth crime represents
the experimentation in risky behavior that is a part of identity development
but desists naturally as individuals develop a stable sense of self and maturity
of judgment. One reason the typical delinquent youth does not grow up to be
an adult criminal is that the developmentally linked values and preferences
that drive his criminal choices as a teenager change in predictable ways as he
matures. Adolescents are not yet the persons they will become-persons
whose choices reflect their individual values and preferences. As the typical
adolescent offender matures, he becomes an adult with personally defined
commitments and values and a stake in his own future plans. He is no longer
inclined to get involved in crime because his adult values (components of his
personal identity) no longer lead him in that direction. Indeed, there is no
reason to believe that the young actor's adult self would endorse his youthful
choices.
The upshot is that the criminal conduct of most young wrongdoers is
quite different from that of typical adult criminals. It is fair to assume that
most adults who engage in criminal conduct act upon subjectively defined
preferences and values, and that their choices can fairly be charged to
deficient moral character. This cannot fairly be said of the crimes of typical
juvenile actors, whose choices, while unfortunate, are shaped by develop-
ment factors that are constitutive of adolescence. To be sure, some
adolescents may be in the early stages of developing a criminal identity and
reprehensible moral character traits-Moffitt's "life-course-persistent"
offenders-but most are not.94  The criminal choices of typical young
offenders differ from those of adults, not only because the choice, qua
choice, is deficient as the product of immature judgment, but also because
the adolescent's criminal act does not express the actor's bad character.
III. Excuse and Mitigation in Criminal Law
In contrast to the binary categorization used to define the criminal
responsibility of juveniles, under general criminal law doctrine, blame-
Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. Soc. 552 (1983)
(stating that "[t]he empirical fact of a decline in the crime rate with age is beyond dispute").
93. Moffitt, supra note 78, at 682-85. Although some "life-course-persistent" offenders do not
initiate antisocial behavior until early adolescence, Moffitt claims that many display a variety of
problem behaviors early in life which persist through adolescence into adulthood. Id.
94. Moffitt, supra note 78, at 684-85.
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worthiness often varies along a continuum. The default position, of course, is
a presumption that adult criminal actors are fully responsible for their
wrongful acts. But the law frequently departs from this position to excuse
defendants from criminal liability altogether or to mitigate blame and
punishment. In this Part, we examine criminal law theory and doctrine to
clarify the attributes of offenders and the circumstances surrounding harmful
acts that reduce or eliminate culpability. These lessons will allow us, in the
next Part, to locate adolescent offenders within this framework.
A. Criminal Law Theories of Responsibility and Excuse
As a preliminary matter, it is important to be clear about why excuse
and mitigation play an important role in defining criminal responsibility and
punishment. How can two offenders who cause the same harm (an insane
killer and his sane counterpart, for example) fairly not be subject to the same
punishment? The answer lies in the importance of the foundational criminal
law principle of penal proportionality. This principle directs that punishment
be proportionate not only to the amount of harm caused or threatened, but
also to the culpability of the offender. Only a blameworthy moral agent
deserves punishment at all, and blameworthiness (and the amount of
punishment deserved) can vary depending on the attributes of the actor or the
circumstances of the offense.
This leads to the question of what makes one actor's conduct more or
less blameworthy than that of another. In response, criminal law scholars
offer a variety of positive and normative theories of culpability and excuse.95
Choice and character theorists often seek to explain criminal law treatment of
excuse and mitigation, paying close attention to the doctrines of duress,
defense against aggression, provocation, and insanity, as well as other factors
that may affect deserved punishment.96  This inquiry rests on the quite
plausible intuition that understanding why actors are deemed not culpable (or
less culpable than the typical actor) illuminates the meaning of culpability.
Not surprisingly, choice and character theorists offer different positive
95. See supra note 10. For a general description of various theories, see Jeremy Horder,
Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General Theory, 12 LAW & PHIL. 193 (1993). Some
theorists offer alternatives to choice and character-based theories. Jean Hampton, for example,
argues that defiance is the source of culpability. See Jean Hampton, Mens Rea, 7 SOC. PHIL. &
POL'Y 1 (1990).
96. Insanity and duress are often analyzed as representative (respectively) of incapacity and
situational excuses. See Duff, supra note 7, at 351-55; Moore, supra note 7, at 31; Brandt, supra
note 9, at 182-87. However, in analyzing culpability, some theorists group as "excuses" all
exculpatory defenses, including voluntary act, self defense, and mistake, as well as those that fit in
the doctrinal categories of justification and excuse. See Kadish, supra note 10, at 265. At a
minimum, the boundary between justification and excuse is not as important for the purposes of this
analysis as it is often assumed to be in criminal law, because the focus is on factors that reduce or
eliminate culpability. See generally Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and
Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (1984).
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accounts of the role and purposes of these doctrines and draw different
inferences about their optimal reach.
Choice theorists adopt a model of culpability based on rationality and
volition, positing the responsible moral agent as one who has the capacity to
make a rational choice and a "fair opportunity" to choose the law-abiding
course.97  Under this view, the legitimacy of criminal punishment is
diminished if an actor's choice departs substantially from this autonomy
model. 98  The actor whose decisionmaking capacity is extremely com-
promised or whose opportunity to make a different (non-criminal) choice is
severely limited may not even meet the minimum threshold conditions of
culpability; he will be excused from criminal responsibility altogether. 99
Thus, the insanity defense excuses the actor whose capacity to understand the
wrongful nature of his act is so distorted as to negate moral agency, and an
actor whose will is overborne by threats of physical harm may be excused on
grounds of duress. Other actors, whose decisionmaking capacities are less
severely impaired, or who are subject to compelling (but not overwhelming)
pressures and constraints that limit their freedom of choice, may pass the
minimum threshold of responsibility but be judged less culpable and de-
serving of less punishment than the typical criminal actor.
Character theory holds that criminal blameworthiness is premised on an
implicit but powerful inference that the wrongful act is the product of the
actor's bad character. This premise is evident, not in standard determinations
of responsibility and punishment (which include no inquiry into character),
but in the defenses that negate or reduce culpability and in the apportionment
of blame at sentencing. °00 In our view, the most defensible version of
character theory maintains the focus on criminal conduct as the object of
punishment, but holds that the culpability of the criminal act varies
depending not simply on the quality of the choice, but on its meaning as an
expression of the actor's moral character. 10 Thus, a lawbreaker who is co-
97. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 8, at 152; Moore, supra note 7, at 31-35.
98. Stephen Morse has described the conditions for excuse as "non-culpable irrationality...
and non-culpable hard choice." See Morse, supra note 3, at 24.
99. Similarly, the actor who did not choose to cause harm, instead acting under a mistake of
fact, may be exculpated. Id.
100. Thus, for example, George Fletcher states, "The only way to work out a theory of excuses
is to suggest that the excuses represent a limited, temporal distortion of the actor's character."
GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKtNG CRIMINAL LAW 802 (1978).
101. Some character theorists argue that the ultimate purpose of criminal law is to punish bad
character per se (rather than bad acts), a claim that has been the target of much legitimate criticism.
Nicola Lacey and Michael Bayles adopt this view. See LACEY, supra note 9, at 65-68; Bayles,
supra note 9, at 5-20; see also Moore, supra note 7, at 49-58 (offering a critique of character
theory). Duff criticizes this extreme position and affirms that conduct is the focus of punishment,
but he argues that criminal liability can only be explained in terms of a link between act and
character. See Duff, supra note 7, at 359-62, 372; see also Horder, supra note 95, at 204-09
(arguing that under character theory, excuse is warranted if a person of good character would act as
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erced to offend under a threat of injury does not act on the basis of bad
character if the threat is such that a person of good character would likely
succumb to the same pressure. The insane actor's choice is an expression of
his mental illness and not of bad character. Under character theory, both
exogenous and endogenous forces that subvert the inference that the criminal
act reflects bad moral character have exculpatory or mitigating importance in
assessing culpability.
Character theory is more controversial than choice theory, in part
because it seems to invite an open-ended assessment of blame on the basis of
criteria that are only indirectly linked to the wrongful act. By limiting the
inquiry about culpability to the connection between the quality of the actor's
decision and her conduct, choice theory requires a more bounded assessment.
Yet, although its normative appeal may be contested, character theory has
considerable explanatory power in some areas of doctrine and practice. First,
evidence that the crime was aberrational in light of the actor's established
character is explicitly a basis for mitigation of punishment. 10 2 Beyond this,
excuse and mitigation often seem to require not only that the actor's reason
and will were overborne, but that the reaction was not morally deficient: In
other words, a person of good character would react similarly. 10 3  For
example, provocation is a mitigating defense to a murder charge, but only if
the angered response was reasonable under the circumstances and not simply
because the actor was subjectively unable to control his rage. 10 4 Similarly,
the accused did); Dan Kahan & Martha Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 346-49 (1996) (arguing that the moral quality of emotions that undermine
rationality and volition determines whether they are exculpatory).
102. For a discussion of mitigating character evidence at sentencing, see infra note 119 and
accompanying text.
103. R.A. Duff argues that focusing solely on choice as the source of criminal liability cannot
explain excuses such as duress and insanity. In his view, what makes a criminal actor fully culpable
is that the act flowed from an intelligible set of attitudes, concerns, and values, and the act displayed
improper indifference to others' interests or the law's values-all aspects of character. What makes
an action "out-of-character" (and less culpable) is that it does not reflect character at all. In other
words, the action is not related to the actor's attitudes, structures of value, or motives, which are
aspects of the individual's continuing identity as a person. See Duff, supra note 7, at 359-61, 378-
79.
104. Reasonable provocation reduces murder to manslaughter. Jerome Michael and Herbert
Wechsler describe the reasonableness requirement as a measure of character:
Provocation... cannot be measured by the intensity of the passions aroused in the
actor by the provocative circumstances. It must be estimated by the probability that
such circumstances would affect most men in like fashion.... [T]he greater the
provocation, measured in that way, the more ground there is for attributing the
intensity of the actor's passions and his lack of self-control ... to the extraordinary
character of the situation... rather than to any extraordinary deficiency in his own
character... [T]he more difficulty [most men] would experience in resisting the
impulse to which he yielded, the less does his succumbing serve to differentiate his
character from theirs.
Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide 11, 37 COLUM. L. REV.
1261, 1281 (1937) (emphasis added). Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum describe the extent to
which the provocation doctrine incorporates a moral evaluation of the loss of control in response to
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under conventional doctrine the coward will be unable to establish self-
defense or duress, however genuine his fear.'
0 5
Our purpose in this Essay is not to take sides in this ongoing debate
between competing theoretical perspectives on culpability. We tend to agree
with the view that neither choice nor character theorists provide a compre-
hensive account of culpability and that both perspectives offer insights of
varying persuasiveness in different doctrinal contexts. 10 6 The important point
for our purposes is that an analysis of adolescent culpability within either of
these theoretical frameworks points to the conclusion that young actors are
less culpable than are typical adults. In a framework that focuses only on
choice, young law violators are poorer decisionmakers with more restricted
opportunities to avoid criminal choices than are adults. Under an approach in
which bad moral character is the ultimate source of culpability, ordinary
adolescents, whose identity is in flux and character unformed, are less culp-
able than typical adult criminals.'
0 7
B. Excuse and Mitigation in Criminal Law Doctrine
1. Categories of Excuse and Mitigation.-We suggested at the outset
that excuse and mitigation are available to actors who are unlike "typical"
criminals in two very different ways-those with deficient decisionmaking
capacities, and those who are "ordinary persons" who offend in response to
extraordinary circumstances. In the first group are actors whose culpability
external circumstances. See supra note 101. See People v. Shields, 575 N.E.2d 538, 545-46 (I11.
1991) (holding that a properly instructed jury could reasonably have found that the sexual assault of
the defendant's child could constitute legally adequate provocation).
105. Compare the unsuccessful self-defense claim of Bernard Goetz (who claimed that he
feared being maimed when he opened fire on four young black men who approached him on the
subway) with that of a battered woman who kills a partner. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y.
1986) (requiring objectively reasonable belief of threat). If these claims are treated differently, it is
not simply because of subjective differences in the fear experienced by the actors but rather on the
basis of an evaluation of the moral legitimacy of the claims. Kahan and Nussbaum point out that a
woman who robs a bank in the face of a threatened beating may be excused on grounds of duress,
while one who allows her child to be harmed in the face of the same threat will likely fail. The will
of both actors is subject to the same coercive force, but one is revealing deficient character, while
the other is not. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 101, at 333-37. Cf People v. Romero, 13 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 332, 340 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that expert testimony on Battered Woman
Syndrome could have persuaded a reasonable jury to accept a duress defense to a robbery charge).
A few states (and the Model Penal Code) apply a subjective test to self-defense claims and thus
would give the coward a defense. See State v. Warlock, 609 A.2d 972, 976 (Vt. 1992) (stating that
"[o]ur law does not hold a nervous coward and fearless bully to an identical reasonable person
standard"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (recognizing a subjective test).
106. As R.A. Duff put it, choice theory is too arid and character theory is too rich. Choice
theorists err in denying the relevance of the link between the act and the actor's underlying personal
identity, while (many) character theorists wrongly discount the importance of the criminal act. See
Duff, supra note 7, at 367-68.
107. R.A. Duff's description of less culpable "out of character" acts as reflecting no character at
all aptly describes adolescent actors. See Duff, supra note 7, at 368.
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for wrongful acts is reduced or excused due to endogenous traits or con-
ditions that undermine their decisionmaking capacity, impairing their ability
to understand the nature and consequences of their wrongful acts. The
primary focus here has been on mental disability and disorder, and the de-
fenses of insanity, diminished capacity, and extreme emotional disturbance
are doctrinal expressions of this type of culpability-reducing condition.
108
Two types of excuse or mitigation are available to actors in the second group.
First, culpability is reduced or negated when, due to exogenous circum-
stances surrounding the offense, the actor faces a difficult choice that leads
her to engage in harmful conduct, and her response is reasonable under the
circumstances (as measured against expected responses of ordinary
people). 109 On this account, the doctrines of duress, provocation, necessity,
and self-defense are exculpatory or mitigating because the actor can explain
the criminal act in terms of unusual exogenous pressures and not moral
deficiency." 0 The link between bad act and bad character is negated more
explicitly in the other category of culpability-reducing evidence invoked by
ordinary persons. Where the conduct is aberrant or "out of character" in light
of the actor's reputation and prior conduct, it is deemed less culpable and
deserving of reduced punishment."' Thus, effectively, the criminal law
recognizes three rough categories of culpability-reducing conditions:
incapacity, coercive circumstances, and out-of-character behavior.
2. Proportionality and Mitigation.-The line between excuse and
mitigation is significant because it defines the categorical boundary of
criminal responsibility. In assessment of the culpability of behavior,
however, most mitigating conditions are of the same kinds as those that
excuse, and the differences are a matter of degree.' 12  Not surprisingly,
108. At common law, infancy was described as this type of excusing condition. See Walkover,
supra note 17 and accompanying text.
109. The difficulty may be due to threats directed at the actor or others, or to other harms that
can be avoided only by engaging in the harmful act.
110. See Michael & Wechsler, supra note 104, at 1279-82. Not all of these categories are
doctrinally classified as excuses, but all result in reduced (or negated) culpability because the actor's
response was reasonable as a response to exogenous circumstances. Defenses against aggression
are classified as justification, but the actor's conduct is justified as a reasonable response to a threat
by his victim. See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 5, at 325-57.
111. Good character alone (without evidence of sufficiently compelling extraordinary
circumstances) can mitigate culpability, but it is never the basis of outright excuse from criminal
responsibility. One could argue that this third type of mitigation is not a distinct category, but rather
functions as a weaker version of the other two, in cases in which the evidence (of incapacity or
extraordinary circumstances) is ambiguous. A pronounced contrast between the actor's established
character and the bad act suggests that either his mental state was temporarily impaired or unusual
circumstances drove him to offend.
112. See HART, supra note 8, at 16 (describing indistinct boundaries among excuse,
justification, and mitigation). All excusing conditions can be mitigating in their less extreme form,
although some sources of mitigation, such as provocation and aberrant conduct, are not sufficiently
exculpatory to serve as the basis of excuse.
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defenses that excuse actors altogether from criminal liability are very
narrowly drawn. 1 3  Culpability is mitigated when a harmful act is
sufficiently blameworthy to meet the minimum threshold of criminal
responsibility, but the actor's capacity or circumstances are compromised (or
general good character is evident) sufficiently to warrant less punishment
than the typical offender. For example, mental disorder that distorts the
actor's decisionmaking but is not severe enough to support an insanity de-
fense can reduce the grade of an offense or result in a less punitive
disposition.114  Under this approach, mitigation plays an important role in
implementing the principle of penal proportionality in the criminal law
without sacrificing the policy objectives of public protection and deterrence.
Calibrated measures of culpability are embedded in the substantive
criminal law, particularly in mens rea doctrine and the law of homicide."15
Mitigation also plays a key role at sentencing, where a broad range of factors
can be considered in the judgment about deserved punishment. 1 6 Sentencing
113. For example, the defense of duress is available only when the actor faces an imminent
threat of death or serious physical injury that "a person of reasonable firmness" would be unable to
resist. See United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170, 178-79 (5th Cir. 1994). An offense committed in
response to a lesser threat (to property, for example) could constitute mitigation, but not excuse.
114. Some jurisdictions recognize homicide defenses of diminished capacity or partial
responsibility that either negate a mens rea element or reduce murder to manslaughter. See BONNIE
ET AL., supra note 5, at 538-40. Under the Model Penal Code, the actor's extreme mental or
emotional disturbance reduces the homicide to manslaughter. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(B).
This provision seems to combine diminished capacity or temporary insanity with provocation.
Although the sufficiency of the emotional disturbance is to be evaluated on the basis of its
reasonableness, reasonableness itself is assessed from the subjective viewpoint of the actor. Mental
illness is also often a general mitigation factor at sentencing. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4637(h) (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
2523(2)(g) (Supp. 2000). In the recent trial of Andrea Yates, the Texas mother who killed her 5
children, the jury rejected Yates's insanity plea but declined to impose the death penalty in light of
her serious mental illness. Jim Yardley, Mother Who Drowned Five Children in Tub Avoids a
Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2002, at Al.
115. Basic mens rea doctrine grades culpability on the basis of the actor's intentions and
awareness of risk-creating circumstances. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02. Moreover, under
specific intent doctrine, an actor with a particular bad purpose is deemed more culpable (and
deserves more punishment) than one who engages in the same conduct without that purpose. See
BONNIE ET AL., supra note 5, at 133. The law of homicide operates through a grading scheme under
which punishment for the most serious of harms varies dramatically depending upon the
blameworthiness of the actor. Thus, the actor who kills intentionally is deemed less culpable when
he does so without premeditation and deliberation. This is because his choice reveals less
consideration of the consequences of his act and less commitment to the evil purpose. One who
kills in response to provocation or under extreme emotional disturbance is guilty only of
manslaughter. The actor who negligently caused the victim's death commits a less serious crime
than she who intended to kill. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210. See generally Michael & Wechsler,
supra note 104, at 1274-90.
116. These factors may also be important to the law's preventive purposes. Often, mitigating
factors are responsive to both retributive and preventive purposes. For example, the actor who
offends in response to duress or the actor who demonstrates good character is less culpable and also
less likely to offend again than the typical offender. However, retributive and preventive purposes
may sometimes cut in opposite directions. Some factors-such as mental disorder-may be
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guidelines routinely include mitigating factors relevant to culpability that can
be grouped in the three categories described above. First, endogenous factors
relating to the quality of the actor's decisionmaking capacity include
impaired cognitive or volitional capacity due to mental illness or retardation,
extreme emotional distress, youth, lack of sophistication, susceptibility to
influence or domination, or evidence that the crime was unplanned and
spontaneous. 117 Typical mitigating factors relating to external circumstances
include duress, provocation, perceived threat, extreme need and domination
that are not severe enough to constitute a defense. 18 The third category
recognizes mitigation when the criminal act was out of character for the
actor.' 1 9 For example, a reduced sentence might result if the crime was a first
offense or an isolated incident; if the actor expressed genuine remorse or
tried to mitigate the harm; if he had a history of steady employment,
fulfillment of family obligations, and good citizenship; or, more generally, if
the criminal act was aberrant in light of the defendant's established character
traits. Under this category, the actor's settled identity as a moral person is
deemed relevant to the assessment of blame.
mitigating of culpability but also suggest that the actor represents a threat to public safety. This
claim is sometimes made concerning immaturity as a mitigating factor, usually as a way to justify
adult punishment for young offenders.
117. For representative sentencing guidelines that include these mitigating factors, see FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.0026 (West 2001) (including impaired cognitive/volitional capacity, mental
disorder, domination by another, and youth); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4637(b), (e), (g)-(h) (1995)
(including extreme mental distress, mental disorder, domination by another, impaired
cognitive/volitional capacity, and age); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2523(2)(b)-(d), (g) (1995 & Supp.
2001) (including extreme mental distress, domination by another, impaired cognitive/volitional
capacity, and age). In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty is
disproportionate punishment for mentally retarded offenders. The Court described the diminished
capacity of this group as the basis for a categorical reduction of culpability. 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2250-
52 (2002).
118. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-1(b)(3) (1995 & Supp. 2002) (listing provocation as a
"mitigating circumstance"), § 2C:44-1(b)(13) (listing undue influence by an older person as a
"mitigating circumstance"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(e)(1) (listing duress, coercion, threat
insufficient to constitute defense but reducing culpability), § 15A- 1340.16(e)(8) (listing provocation
as a mitigating factor) (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113(2) (1997) (listing provocation as a
mitigating factor), § 40-35-113(12) (listing duress or domination as mitigating factors even though
neither is sufficient to constitute a defense); CAL. CT. R. 4.423(a)(8) (stating that one mitigating
factor is that "[t]he defendant was motivated by a desire to provide necessities for his or her family
or self').
119. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were amended to include "aberrant behavior" as a
mitigating factor. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.20, cmt. n.l(c) (1998). Such
behavior must "represen[t] a marked deviation by the defendant from an otherwise law-abiding
life." State guidelines also include mitigating factors based on past reputation and character. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.0026 (2)(h)(j) (West 2001) (allowing mitigation for compensation of
the victim and the isolated nature of the incident, for which defendant has shown remorse); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211E § 3(d)(13)-(14), (16) (Supp. 2001) (allowing mitigation based on
community ties, family responsibilities, character, and personal history); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
1340.16(e)(12) (2001) (recognizing good character or good reputation in community as mitigating
factors); CAL. CT. R. 4.423(b)(5) (allowing mitigation where the defendant made restitution to
victim).
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The excuse and mitigation categories that we have described would be
explained quite differently by character and choice theorists. Under char-
acter theory, each category can be understood as reducing culpability by
negating or weakening the premise that the criminal act derives from
attitudes and structures of value that are aspects of the individual's
continuing identity as a person. Choice theorists, in contrast, would link
mitigation and excuse on the basis of incapacity and coerced circumstances
to the requirement of rational and voluntary choice, and would reject the le-
gitimacy of the third category altogether. We are persuaded by our sketch of
criminal law doctrine that, as a descriptive matter, both the quality of the
criminal choice and extent to which it reflects the actor's bad character are
important in assessments of blame.
IV. A Mitigation Model Of Juvenile Justice
In this Part, we analyze how lawmakers can accommodate the unique
attributes of adolescent wrongdoers in a framework grounded in conventional
criminal law doctrine and theory. A fair system of juvenile justice will
respond to youth crime by imposing punishment that is proportionate to the
blameworthiness of young offenders. And, under standard criminal law
measures, the criminal acts of typical adolescents are less culpable than those
of their adult counterparts. A justice policy grounded in a mitigation model
coherently harmonizes the treatment of young offenders with the response to
mitigating conditions generally under the criminal law.
A. Locating Adolescence on the Excuse-Mitigation Continuum
As a preliminary matter, a culpability line should be drawn between
children and adolescents. The very small group of offenders who are pre-
adolescents should be excused from responsibility for their crimes, as they
presumptively were at common law. Excusing children who commit crimes
is compatible with the conventional drawing of the responsibility boundary
in criminal law. Pre-adolescent children are appropriately grouped with
actors suffering from severe disability because their cognitive decision-
making capacity is so different from that of adults.
120
The differences that distinguish adolescents from adults are more
subtle-mitigating, but not exculpatory. Most obviously, cognitive and
psycho-social immaturity undermines youthful decisionmaking in ways that
reduce culpability. Moreover, due to their immaturity, adolescents may be
more vulnerable to coercive pressures than are adults. Finally because their
120. In practice, this would mean that children would be subject only to purely rehabilitative
interventions, and not subject to criminal punishment. Secure confinement would be appropriate on
civil commitment grounds, but not in correctional facilities. Child welfare interventions could
result in state custody in cases where parents are unable to supervise and control their children.
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criminal acts are influenced by normal developmental processes, typical
adolescent law breakers are different from fully responsible adults whose
crimes are assumed to be the product of bad moral character. Thus, young
offenders are less culpable than adults because of their diminished capacity;
but they are also appropriately identified with actors who succumb to co-
ercive pressures or who demonstrate that their criminal acts were out of
character, and who are less culpable because their responses are those of
ordinary persons.
1. Immature Judgment and Diminished Capacity.-The adolescent who
commits a crime typically is not so deficient in his decisionmaking capacity
that he cannot understand the immediate harmful consequences of his choice
or its wrongfulness-as might be true of a mentally disordered person or a
child. Yet, in ways that we have described, the developmental factors that
drive adolescent decisionmaking predictably contribute to choices based on
immature judgment. Due to these developmental influences, youths are
likely to act more impulsively and to weigh the consequences of their options
differently from adults, discounting risks and future consequences, and over-
valuing (by adult standards) peer approval, immediate consequences, and the
excitement of risk taking. These influences are predictable, systematic and
developmental in nature (rather than simply an expression of personal values
and preferences), and they undermine decisionmaking capacity in ways that
are accepted as mitigating culpability. Thus, youthful criminal choices may
share much in common with those of adults whose decisionmaking capacities
are impaired by emotional disturbance, mental illness or retardation,
vulnerability to influence or domination by others, or failure to understand
fully the consequences of their acts.
To some extent, lawmakers, by including youth or immaturity as a
mitigating factor under many sentencing statutes, implicitly acknowledge
that immature judgment mitigates the culpability of young decisionmakers.1
21
Only in the context of capital punishment, however, has the rationale for
treating youthful immaturity as a mitigating condition been articulated.
122
Within the larger death penalty debate, the question of whether juveniles
should ever be executed is hotly contested. In practice, the execution of juv-
121. Many sentencing statutes list youth as a mitigating factor. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
921.0026(2)(k) (West 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(4) (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
18-304 (l)(g)(2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-113(6) (1997).
122. The Supreme Court has made clear that a broad range of mitigating evidence must be
admitted in a capital sentencing proceeding. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 105
(1982) (holding that mitigating evidence of turbulent family history and emotional disturbance must
be admitted). The Court has struck down statutes that limit discretion at sentencing by excluding
most mitigating evidence. Compare Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)
(holding that a statute imposing a mandatory death sentence under certain conditions was
unconstitutional) with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 163-64 (1976) (upholding a statute that
allowed broad-ranging mitigating evidence at capital sentencing).
[Vol. 81:799
Blaming Youth
eniles is either formally prohibited or a rare occurrence, a pattern that
acknowledges that young offenders are not fully responsible, at least not to
the extent of deserving the ultimate punishment. 123 The Supreme Court has
declined to hold that the death penalty is categorically disproportionate
punishment for all juveniles, 124 but in Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court
prohibited the execution of youths whose offenses occurred before their six-
teenth birthday. 2 5 In his plurality opinion, Justice Stevens focused on the
immature judgment of adolescents in explaining why such punishment would
violate the principle of proportionality-and thus, the Eighth Amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment:
[L]ess culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile
than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. The basis of this
conclusion is too obvious to require extended explanation.
Inexperience, less education and less intelligence make the teenager
less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at
the same time he or she is more apt to be motivated by mere emotion
or peer pressure than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not
trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain
why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that
of an adult.'
26
Although the judgment of blameworthiness that is at issue in the death
penalty context occupies an extreme pole on the culpability continuum,
Justice Stevens's analysis of the relationship between immature judgment
and blameworthiness is applicable generally to the criminal punishment of
young actors. 127 The youthful characteristics identified by Justice Stevens
impede decisionmaking in crime settings in which the death penalty is not at
issue. Moreover, under the logic of Thompson, contemporary reformers have
it backwards when they argue that youths can be classified as adults for
123. Of the 18 states with minimum age restrictions on the imposition of the death penalty, 12
states set the age at 18. Twenty states have no minimum age, but the execution of juveniles is
extremely rare. For a discussion of state statutes regulating juvenile death penalty, see Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 819 (1988) and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 365-74 (1989).
Proportionality analysis directs that the death penalty be reserved for only the most culpable
criminals, and thus, opponents of imposing the death penalty on juveniles argue that it is never
appropriate because immaturity is categorically mitigating. Only a handful of countries authorize
the execution of juveniles. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and International
Law, 52 DuKE L.J. (forthcoming 2002) (noting that only six nations worldwide (including the
United States, Congo, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria) allow execution of juveniles).
124. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380 (rejecting a categorical ban for 16- and 17-year-olds).
125. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
126. Id. at 835. See also Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002) (citing the trend
toward prohibition and holding that, based on the reduced culpability of persons with mental
disability, the execution of a mentally retarded person is a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
127. Psychologists might quibble with Justice Stevens's description of the source of immature




serious crimes but not for minor offenses. 128 Thompson supports the con-
clusion that the importance of recognizing the reduced culpability of young
criminals grows as the stakes increase. Thompson also recognizes that
immaturity can mitigate culpability categorically, and that individualized
consideration of this factor may be inadequate protection. This point is
important, as it suggests a difference between youth as a mitigator and other
factors that reduce culpability, a point to which we will return shortly.
1 29
2. Adolescent Offenders as "Ordinary Persons. "--That immaturity is
mitigating as a type of diminished capacity is, in Justice Stevens's words,
"too obvious to require extended explanation."13 What is less obvious is that
the other sources of mitigation in criminal law also illuminate key differences
between adolescents and typical criminals. Adolescent offenders indeed are
different from the rest of us, but they (or most of them) are also ordinary
persons-although not ordinary adults. This is not to say, of course, that all
adolescents will commit crimes, or that those who do are without blame. It is
to say, however, that those whom psychologists call normative adolescents
may well succumb to the extraordinary pressures of a criminogenic social
context. Beyond this, the typical adolescent can be distinguished from most
criminals and aligned with ordinary persons whose crimes deserve less than
full punishment, because his wrongful act does not derive from attitudes and
values that are part of his continuing identity as a person; in other words, his
crime is not an expression of bad character. Here again, immature youths are
not like ordinary adults-fully realized selves who have internalized the
law's values. Instead, adolescent crime is a costly manifestation of influ-
ences and processes that are characteristic of a discrete stage in human
development. If we consider youthful culpability against the predicted
responses of an "ordinary adolescent," the mitigating character of immaturity
becomes clear.
a. Situational Mitigation and the Context of Adolescence.-As we
have suggested, adolescents in high crime neighborhoods are subject both to
unique social pressures that induce them to join in criminal activity and to
restrictions on their freedom that tangibly limit their ability to escape. These
restrictions are constitutive of a well-defined legal status resulting from
youthful dependency that substantially limits autonomy. Beyond this, ordi-
128. The legislative trend has been to maintain exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction for less
serious offenses but to assume without inquiry that public protection warrants adult punishment for
more serious offenses. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
129. In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court declined to extend this categorical approach to youths
who are age 16 or older, emphasizing that individualized consideration of immaturity and youth
would be part of every capital sentencing provision involving a minor. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374-
77, 377 n.7.
130. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 835.
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nary adolescents lack the life skills and psycho-social capacities that would
allow them to escape the extraordinary circumstances present in these social
contexts. Indeed, ordinary adults might well succumb to the pressures.
These circumstances are similar in kind to those involved in claims of duress,
provocation, necessity, or domination by co-defendants, and appropriately
are deemed mitigating of culpability. When adolescents cross the line to
legal adulthood, the formal disabilities of youth are lifted; young adults can
avoid the situational pressures they face by removing themselves from the
criminogenic setting. Moreover, normal maturation enables individuals to
cope with circumstances that are overwhelming in adolescence. Thus, adults
have no claim of situational mitigation on the ground that they are restricted
to a social setting in which avoiding crime is difficult.'
31
The framework we employ for analyzing the culpability of juveniles in
response to extraordinary circumstances uses as a baseline the reactions of
ordinary adolescents. Under the conventional standard, criminal conduct is
less culpable if an ordinary ("reasonable") person, with a typical set of adult
psychological and moral capacities, might be led to respond similarly when
subjected to the same unusual pressures as the wrongdoer.132  Yet, this
baseline can be criticized for failing to accommodate responses to external
pressures that are reasonable for adolescents. 33 The psychological attributes
that normal adolescents bring to their experience increase the challenges they
131. The inability to escape distinguishes adolescents from adult offenders, who might argue
that they are less culpable than other criminal actors because of their "rotten social background" or
"toxic social context." Some commentators have argued for a defense, available to adult
lawbreakers who grew up in crime-inducing settings without inculcation in pro-social norms or
opportunities to succeed in socially acceptable ways, on the ground that these social forces combine
to constrain their freedom to avoid crime. Delgado, supra note 83, at 63-65, 64 n.363. Among the
judiciary, Judge David Bazelon has argued that an impoverished background should be recognized
as mitigating. See David Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 385, 395
(1976). This defense generally has been rejected by lawmakers or scholars, in part because of the
high social cost incurred if a defense were available to a large open-ended category of adult
offenders otherwise indistinguishable from the norm. More importantly, perhaps, the defense
threatens to dissolve the important but delicate line between free will and determinism, the
boundary of criminal responsibility. Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A
Reply to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1251-53 (1976). In contrast, recognition of
social context as situational mitigation that is limited to juveniles as a class does not carry the same
threat of unraveling the core of criminal responsibility.
132. See Duff, supra note 7, at 358-59 (discussing the role of the "reasonable person").
133. Some courts have adopted the approach we suggest in evaluating adolescent conduct under
a reasonable person standard. E.g., In re William G., 963 P.2d 187, 293 (Ariz. App. Div. 1987)
(holding that the determination of whether the defendant's conduct was a "gross deviation" from the
conduct of a reasonable person should use the standard of a 15-year-old). The argument is similar
to the feminist challenge to the "reasonable man" standard. See Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J.
1087, 1105-20 (1986) (challenging the definition of "reasonable resistance" in rape law as requiring
male physical strength). See also Nancy Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The
Ideology of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1178-79 (1990)




face in responding to crime-inducing social contexts. The baseline
adjustment clarifies that many adolescents responding to external
circumstances, like ordinary adults who claim situational mitigation, can
explain their criminal choices in terms of exogenous pressures rather than
individual moral deficiency.
b. Development, Character, and Culpability.-The conclusion that
blameworthiness decreases when actors can negate the inference that their
bad acts reflect bad moral character has a broader importance in assessing the
culpability of typical young offenders. In one sense, to be sure, young
wrongdoers are not like ordinary adults whose acts are less culpable on this
ground. The criminal choice of the typical adolescent cannot be evaluated by
comparing it to his previously established good character, because his
personal identity and his character have not yet stabilized. Yet, like the adult
actor who establishes mitigation, it can be said that the adolescent's harmful
act does not express his bad character; indeed, it does not manifest
"character" at all, 134 but something else-in this case, developmental
immaturity. Most youths will outgrow their inclination to get involved in
crime and mature into persons who do not reject the law's values.
Explicit recognition of this critical difference between typical criminals
and adolescent offenders illuminates the moral intuitions that inform our
uneasy response when a young offender like Lionel Tate is sentenced as an
adult. If Lionel serves a long prison term for his crime, the adult individual
who will be incarcerated for Tiffany's death will be a different person, in a
real sense, from the unformed earlier "person" who caused her death. Our
intuition is that adult Lionel is less responsible for his youthful crime than
would be true if he killed as an adult. To be sure, personal identity can evolve
and change over the course of adult life, and accountability is seriously
weakened if the potential for "reform" signifies that individuals cannot be
held responsible for misdeeds.' 35  But the transition from adolescence to
adulthood is different from the idiosyncratic changes that may take place in
134. See Duff, supra note 7, 359-61, 378-79. The inference, of course, is that if the wrongful
act does reflect "character," it is bad character-settled dispositions and values that lead the actor to
engage in crime.
135. Philosophers have examined the implications of change in personal identity over time.
Derek Parfit argues that an individual's responsibility for conduct may attenuate over time as
personal identity changes, and that at some point, the later self becomes a fundamentally different
person whose responsibility for the earlier self's act is questionable. See generally Derek Parfit,
Later Selves and Moral Principles, in PHILOSOPHY AND PERSONAL RELATIONS 137 (Alan
Montefiore ed., 1973) (arguing that personal identity over time is not "all-or-nothing" but a matter
of degree). The criminal law is ordinarily not interested in whether an individual's identity has
changed since he committed the offense. However, occasionally, when many years elapse between
the crime and the apprehension, and the actor has lived an exemplary life in the interim, reservations
are expressed about whether full retribution is warranted. Rebecca Dresser, Personal Identity and
Punishment, 70 B.U. L. REV. 395,445 (1990).
[Vol. 81:799
Blaming Youth
the lives of adults. 136 The identity of the young person on whom punishment
is imposed is amorphous and undefined, and the coalescence of the self is a
predictable, systematic, and developmental process that occurs over a
relatively short period of time.
Our analysis also clarifies why the crime of the adult actor with
"adolescent" traits warrants a different response than does that of the typical
young offender. Although most impulsive youths who enjoy risky activities
and focus on immediate consequences will mature into adults with different
values, some adult criminals may have traits that are similar to their younger
counterparts. In the case of the adult, however, the predispositions, values,
and preferences that motivate him most likely are not developmental but
characterological and are unlikely to change merely with the passage of
time. 137 Adolescent traits that contribute to criminal conduct are not typical
of adulthood. In an adult, they become part of the personal identity of an
individual who is not respectful of the values of the criminal law and who
deserves the full measure of punishment when he violates its prohibitions.
B. Categorical Mitigation-Juvenile Justice as a Separate System
If, in fact, adolescent offenders are generally less culpable than their
adult counterparts, how should the legal system recognize their diminished
responsibility? At a structural level, the first important policy choice is
whether immaturity should be considered on an individualized basis, 138 as is
typical of most other mitigating conditions, or as the basis for a separate
category of young offenders. Traditional juvenile justice policy employed a
categorical approach that continues in a diluted form in the contemporary
juvenile court and correctional system. As the boundary between the juve-
nile and adult system breaks down, however, evaluation of immaturity as a
136. The transition to adulthood is also quite different from the kind of "jailhouse conversion"
transformation often seen in prisoners, which is often viewed (correctly, we think) with suspicion.
See Pat Robertson, Speech on Religious Role in the Administration of the Death Penalty, 9 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 215, 215 (2000) (discussing the frequency and dubious nature of jailhouse
conversions).
137. Some young adults may simply be slow to mature; their crimes are less culpable on this
account. As time passes, however, their adolescent traits can fairly be ascribed to personal identity.
Whether the immaturity of young adults should count as mitigation may depend on our confidence
in discerning whether the traits are developmental or characterological. As we argue below, there is
much to recommend a categorical approach, as individualized assessment of immaturity may be
error-prone.
138. An individualized assessment of the immaturity of the offender focusing on culpability
could inform the charging decision (adult vs. juvenile court prosecution), the evaluation of a modem
infancy defense, or the sentencing judgment. Under the common law infancy defense, judgments
about whether immaturity was exculpating were made on an individualized basis for youths
between the ages of 7 and 14 years. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. Inquiry could
also focus on whether a youth's competence to stand trial is compromised by immaturity. See
generally Grisso, supra note 35, at 6 (noting that while mental defects may limit an adult's
competence to stand trial, "undeveloped capacities" may limit juveniles).
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mitigator increasingly takes place (if at all) on an individualized basis in a
transfer hearing or at sentencing.
139
The uniqueness of immaturity as a mitigating condition argues for the
adoption of (or renewed commitment to) a categorical approach in this
context. Other mitigators-emotional disturbance and coercive external
circumstances, for example-affect criminal choices with endless variety and
idiosyncratic impact on behavior. Thus, individualized consideration of
mitigation is appropriate when these phenomena are involved. 140 In contrast,
the capacities and processes associated with adolescence are characteristic of
individuals in a relatively defined group, whose development follows a
roughly prescribed course to maturity, and whose criminal choices are
predictably affected in ways that mitigate culpability. Although individual
variations exist within the age cohort of adolescence, coherent boundaries
can delineate a minimum age for adult adjudication, as well as a period of
years beyond this minimum when a strong presumption of reduced
culpability operates to keep most youths in a separate system.14' The age
boundary is justified if the presumption of immaturity can be applied confi-
dently to most individuals in the group. This approach offers substantial
efficiencies over one in which immaturity is assessed on a case-by-case
basis, particularly since mitigation claims likely would be a part of every
criminal adjudication involving a juvenile.
Adopting a mitigation framework does not mean that all youths are less
mature than adults in their decisionmaking capacity or that all juveniles are
unformed in their identity development. Some individuals exhibit mature
judgment at an early age-although most of these youths are not offenders.
For others, antisocial tendencies that begin in childhood continue in a stable
pattern of criminal conduct that defines their adult characters. 42  Adult
punishment of mature youths might be fair if these individuals could be
identified with some degree of certainty. But we currently lack the diag-
nostic tools to evaluate psycho-social maturity reliably on an individualized
basis or to distinguish young career criminals from ordinary adolescents who,
as adults, will repudiate their reckless experimentation. 143 Litigating maturity
139. See supra note 121.
140. Mental retardation, in contrast, may justify a more categorical approach, as the Supreme
Court recognized in the death penalty context in Atkins v. Virginia.
141. We are reluctant to recommend specific age boundaries for juvenile court jurisdiction,
because other considerations besides reduced culpability will go into this judgment (such as public
safety and protection of the future prospects of young offenders). Our goal is to provide the
theoretical framework for a separate mitigation category based on immaturity, not to define the
precise boundaries of the juvenile justice system.
142. Moffitt labels this small group "life-course-persistent" offenders. See Moffitt, supra note
78 at 682-85.
143. For example, Moffitt identifies a pattern of dysfunction and antisocial tendencies
beginning in the early childhoods of life-course-persistent offenders that distinguishes them from
adolescent-limited offenders. Id. at 679-85. But some children who have serious behavior
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on a case-by-case basis is likely to be an error-prone undertaking, with the
outcomes determined by factors other than immaturity.
A developmentally-informed boundary constraining decisionmakers
represents a collective pre-commitment to recognizing the mitigating
character of youth in assigning blame. Otherwise, immaturity often may be
ignored when the exigencies of a particular case engender a punitive
response; indeed, it is likely to count as mitigating only when the youth
otherwise presents a sympathetic case. This concern is critical, given the
evidence that illegitimate racial and ethnic biases influence attitudes about
the punishment of young offenders and that decisionmakers appear to
discount the mitigating impact of immaturity in minority youths. 144  The
integrity and legitimacy of any individualized decisionmaking process is
vulnerable to contamination from racist attitudes or from unconscious racial
stereotyping that operates even among individuals who may lack overt
prejudice. 145 In the death penalty context, the Supreme Court implicitly has
recognized that categorical restrictions on individualized blaming judgments
are sometimes necessary to safeguard against racism. 146  Similarly, a
structural boundary that hinders adult adjudication of young offenders is
justified as a counterweight to this pernicious influence.
Categorical recognition of the mitigating impact of immaturity provides
the conceptual framework for a separate justice system for juveniles but does
not itself dictate a particular set of institutional arrangements. 147 A variety of
arrangements, including a systematic sentencing discount for young offend-
ers in adult court, might satisfy the demands of proportionality.
48
Ultimately, the case for a separate system rests on utilitarian considerations
as well as on proportionality concerns. Because most young lawbreakers are
problems in childhood will defy this pattern and not become antisocial adults. See Rolf Loeber &
Magna Stouthamer-Loeber, Development of Juvenile Aggression and Violence, 53 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 242, 242-44 (1998) (arguing that research demonstrates that some violent children
discontinue violence before reaching adulthood).
144. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
145. See Graham, supra note 49.
146. The best example of such a categorical restriction is the prohibition against imposing the
death penalty for rape, which historically was available in many southern states, and probably most
often imposed when black men raped white women. See Katherine K. Baker, Once a Rapist?
Motivational Evidence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 594-95 (1997)
(discussing the disparate treatment of black rapists, and noting that the overwhelming majority of
men executed for rape between 1930 and 1967 were black (citing MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 75 (1973))). In Coker v.
Georgia, the Supreme Court held that imposing the death penalty for rape was disproportionate
punishment in violation of the 8th Amendment. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
147. As a practical matter, it is fair to describe the reduced culpability of youth as a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for the establishment of a separate system.
148. Barry Feld argues for a unified criminal justice system under which young offenders get a
"youth discount" at sentencing. BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE JUVENILE COURT 302-03 (1999).
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"adolescent-limited" offenders, the social cost of youth crime will be
minimized by policies that attend to the impact of punishment on the future
lives and prospects of young offenders. The research suggests that a separate
juvenile court and correctional system are more likely than the adult justice
system to offer an environment in which youths can successfully "mature
out" of their antisocial tendencies and to provide educational and job training
programs to prepare young offenders for conventional adult roles. 149 Thus, to
a considerable extent, social welfare and fairness converge to support a
separate juvenile justice system grounded in mitigation.
Sometimes, however, youths should be subject to adult punishment. A
policy that treats immaturity as a mitigating condition is viable only to the
extent that public protection is not seriously compromised. Immature
offenders can be a threat to public safety, and public tolerance of youthful
misconduct, as we have seen, is tenuous at best. Moreover, both propor-
tionate punishment and public protection are important purposes of the
criminal law. At some point, public safety concerns dictate that young
recidivists who inflict large amounts of social harm must be incapacitated as
adults. This response may undermine proportionality to some extent, but, in
practice, the sacrifice is likely to be modest. This is so because the small
group of youths who are recidivist violent offenders are generally older
teens, and they are more likely than other adolescent lawbreakers to be young
career criminals of settled dispositions. That is not to say that we should
"throw away the key" when we incapacitate these youths. Given the
uncertainty of predicting adult character during adolescence, efforts should
be made to protect against iatrogenic prison effects and to invest in the future
post-incarceration lives of even serious chronic offenders. Nonetheless, a
mechanism to protect society from harms caused by dangerous youths is a
critically important safety valve for a well-functioning juvenile justice sys-
tem based on mitigation.
Implementing a mitigation-based model of juvenile justice will require
significant shifts in crime policy, but it will not require a radical overhaul of
the juvenile justice system itself. Probably because of the scathing criticisms
of its inadequacies, the juvenile system has undergone substantial change in
149. Research evidence indicates that adult punishment of adolescents may contribute to
recidivism. Jeffrey Fagan has compared youths serving prison sentences in one jurisdiction with a
sample matched for seriousness of offense incapacitated in juvenile correctional facilities in an
adjacent state. He found higher recidivism rates among imprisoned youths. See Jeffrey Fagan, The
Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among
Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 LAW & POL'Y 77 (1996). Advocates for tougher sanctions duck
this problem by assuming that most young offenders are criminal careerists. The evidence that we
have described contradicts this assumption. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. See
generally Scott & Grisso, supra note 76 (arguing that a separate juvenile system is more likely to
promote young offenders' maturation into productive adults); ZIMRING, supra note 30, at 81-83
(arguing that giving young offenders "room to reform" should be a goal of youth crime policies).
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the past generation, evolving toward one that increasingly emphasizes ac-
countability and public protection.1 50 Although the public image of the
modem juvenile court continues to be distorted by lingering echoes of the
traditional rhetoric, delinquents under its jurisdiction are increasingly subject
to proportionate punishment for their offenses.
Nonetheless, a large gap separates contemporary youth crime policy
from one that is optimally grounded in mitigation, in part because the
purposes and rationale of the contemporary juvenile system lack a coherent
theory. First, rather than systematically seeking to reform the system pur-
suant to a goal of tailoring dispositions to the culpability of young offenders,
lawmakers have incorporated accountability and public protection in a
piecemeal fashion, mostly in response to political pressures. More
importantly, in response to those same forces, the boundary between the
juvenile and adult systems has become very porous under recent reforms.
Youths can be subject to adult adjudication and punishment today for a broad
range of crimes, including many, such as car theft and drug transactions, that
appear to be quintessential adolescent behavior. 151 Young criminals can also
be tried as adults for first offenses which may well be experimental behavior
that would not be repeated. Neither fairness nor utility are well served by
these responses.
Our goal in this Essay has been to develop a theoretical framework for
youth crime policy that is based on the empirical reality of adolescence and is
also compatible with standard notions of culpability embodied in the criminal
law. Both traditional and contemporary lawmakers have ignored the
relationship between immaturity and criminal responsibility, with
unfortunate results. Our analysis shows that scientific evidence supports the
claim that most adolescents are less mature than adults in ways that distin-
guish their criminal choices, and that this immaturity mitigates culpability
but does not excuse young law violators from criminal responsibility.
Because it is solidly grounded in criminal law doctrine and theory, a
mitigation-based model of juvenile justice offers a legitimacy that neither the
traditional rehabilitative model nor the recent full-responsibility reforms can
150. Under few, if any, modem juvenile codes is rehabilitation described as the principal goal
of delinquency interventions. Many include policy statements that include accountability and
community protection as goals. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-227 (4) (Michie 1950; Cum. &
Supp. 2002) (stating that the purpose of the juvenile code is to protect the community against
juveniles' harmful acts, to reduce incidence of juvenile crime, and to hold offenders accountable for
their acts). For similar statutes, see supra note 29.
151. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318 (b)(1)(6) (Michie 1987) (holding that a 14-year-old
can be charged as an adult for soliciting a minor to join a criminal street gang); ILL. COMP. STATS.
ANN. § 405/5-4(6)(a) (1993) (holding that a 15-year-old charged with selling drugs in school is not
a minor).
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claim. Moreover, our proposed approach can accommodate the seemingly
conflicting goals of protecting public safety and responding to the attributes
of this unique group of wrongdoers without abandoning basic criminal law
principles.
